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Article
Public Employee Free Speech and the
Privatization of the First Amendment
ADAM SHINAR
Constitutional protection of public employee speech has been declining
for the past forty years, yet the reason for the decline has remained elusive.
This Article puts forward a novel theory situating public employee speech
in larger structural transformations in governmental organization. It
identifies a “public/private convergence,” the main feature of which is that
public officials are increasingly viewed as private employees, resulting in a
significant erosion of their free speech rights. This erosion is exacerbated
by rising levels of privatization and civil service reforms exhibiting the
same mode of thought: that public employees are no different from private
employees. These trends have far reaching First Amendment implications
that up until now have remained largely unexplored.
Against this background, this Article argues that the privatization of
public employee speech doctrine should be reconsidered for three main
reasons. First, it overlooks the ways in which the public sector does not
operate like the market. Second, it risks eroding the unique norms and
culture the civil service aims to foster. Finally, it undermines a system of
internal checks on state power that are especially important given the
reduction in external monitoring capacity. Accordingly, the Article
proposes two directions for reform: a doctrinal framework that resolves
the problems with the Court’s current position, and a new governance
framework that relies on internal regulatory channels to encourage public
employee voice.
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Public Employee Speech and the
Privatization of the First Amendment
ADAM SHINAR∗
I. INTRODUCTION
The twentieth century saw an unprecedented rise in the constitutional
protection of speech—a trajectory that has continued into the twenty-first
century. The Supreme Court’s recent decisions to strike down limits on
corporate expenditures on political campaigns,1 to revoke damages for
emotional distress caused by speech,2 to invalidate legislation regulating
violent video games3 and depictions of animal cruelty,4 to expand the scope
of commercial speech,5 and, most recently, to protect knowingly false
statements,6 have positioned freedom of expression as the most protected,
and perhaps most important, constitutional right.
Curiously, during the past forty years, as the Court expanded free
speech protections for individuals it also consistently cut back on free
speech protections for public sector employees. These employees have
seen their speech rights dwindle close to their nineteenth-century level,
when no constitutional protection was afforded.
Consider, for example, the recent case of Bryan Gonzalez. Gonzalez
∗
Assistant Professor, Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya. S.J.D. &
LL.M., Harvard Law School; LL.B., Hebrew University of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Ori Aronson,
David Barron, Faisal Bhabha, Caroline Corbin, Sam Erman, Claire Houston, Lisa Kelly, Heidi
Kitrosser, Shay Lavie, Orly Lobel, Martha Minow, Helen Norton, David Pozen, Issi Rosen-Zvi, Ben
Sachs, Paul Secunda, Roy Shapira, Jennifer Shkabatur, Anna Su, Mark Tushnet, Katie Young, and to
participants at the Faculty Research Seminar at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, the
Loyola-Chicago Constitutional Law Colloquium, the Harvard Law School S.J.D. Colloquium, the Yale
Law School Freedom of Expression Scholars conference, and participants at faculty workshops at Bar
Ilan University, Hebrew University, Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, Haifa University, and Tel Aviv
University.
1
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 339, 341 (2010) (holding that the First
Amendment prohibits limits on independent political expenditures by corporations and unions).
2
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011) (holding that speech on a public issue on a
public sidewalk cannot give rise to tort liability of emotional distress).
3
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741–42 (2011) (holding that video games are
protected speech under the First Amendment).
4
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481–82 (2010) (invalidating a law that criminalized
depictions of animal cruelty because it was overly broad under First Amendment doctrine).
5
Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2659 (2011) (invalidating a law that restricted the sale of
data revealing doctors’ prescription practices).
6
United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543 (2012) (invalidating part of the Stolen Valor Act
of 2005, which criminalized false claims of having received a military medal).
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was a United States Border Patrol agent along the U.S.-Mexico border.7
While at work, Gonzalez spoke to a fellow agent about the drug-related
violence in Mexico and its effects on their job.8 Gonzalez said that if
marijuana was legalized, the cartel violence would stop.9 The drug
problems in America, he added, were attributable to an American demand
for drugs.10 Gonzalez also mentioned an organization—Law Enforcement
Against Prohibition—made up of former law enforcement officials who are
critical of the “war on drugs.”11 When Gonzalez’s superiors soon learned
of this conversation, they fired him.12 The termination letter stated his
personal views were “contrary to the core characteristics of Border Patrol
Agents, which are patriotism, dedication, and esprit de corps.”13
Gonzalez’s case is interesting not only because he was fired, but
because in all likelihood he could not have been fired for the same
expression in 1968—when constitutional speech protections for public
employees were at their height. This Article, therefore, starts with a basic
question: Why has the Court, an otherwise aggressive defender of free
speech rights, driven protections for public employees to the lowest ebb in
more than a century? The decline in constitutional protection, I argue,
cannot be understood by focusing exclusively on First Amendment
doctrine. That doctrine tells us that public employees today enjoy less
protection than their counterparts forty years ago, but fails to explain how
particular social, economic, and philosophical commitments have shaped
present free speech conceptions.
While the decline in constitutional protection for public employees has
been noted by scholars, few have offered a convincing and comprehensive
explanation for its occurrence.14 This Article seeks to fill that gap by
putting forward a novel explanation—the “public/private convergence
thesis.” I argue that it is no coincidence that the constitutional speech
rights public employees have today are close to their nineteenth-century
level, because back then public employees were not considered to be any
different from private sector employees. Indeed, the Article argues that the
decreasing speech protections for public employees result from a
background understanding that views public employees as no different
7

Gonzalez v. Manjarrez, No. EP-11-CV-29-KC, 2013 WL 152177, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 4,

2013).
8

Complaint at 3, Gonzalez, 2013 WL 152177 (No. EP-11-CV-29-KC).
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id. at 4.
12
Id. at 2, 4.
13
Id. at 4.
14
But see Paul M. Secunda, Neoformalism and the Reemergence of the Rights-Privilege
Distinction in Public Employment Law, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 907, 908 (2011) (asserting that “[t]he
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions in public employment has figured most notably in First
Amendment free speech”). For further discussion, see infra note 90.
9
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from private employees and hence seeks to equalize their constitutional
status. This equalization is done by leveling down the constitutional rights
enjoyed by public employees to those of private sector employees who do
not enjoy First Amendment protection at work because of the lack of state
action. Although the convergence may not be intentional, it is nevertheless
informed by a background understanding, one which maps onto larger
transformations in government organization exhibiting the same mode of
thought, that public employees are no different than private employees.
The public/private convergence is troubling because there are
differences between the government and the private sector, and between
private and public employees. These differences should be maintained
rather than obscured. Accordingly, the Article identifies four difficulties
that stem from the project of convergence. First, the importation of market
logics into the government workplace as a primary metric confuses firms,
which operate in a competitive for-profit environment, with government,
which does not. Second, convergence misunderstands the task of
government. Employment at will is the basic norm in private employment
because it views the employer as “owning the job with the property right to
control the job and the worker who fills it.”15 But the government’s
property is, in an important sense, our own. Thus, government is a trustee
of the public interest in a way that private firms are not. Third, the
marketization of the public workplace means losing sight of the importance
of public service and its unique norms and culture. When public workers
are conditioned to operate like market participants, the likelihood that they
will espouse a public service ethic decreases, as does the likelihood that
they will exercise speech in a beneficial way. Finally and most crucially,
public employees are often in the best position to inform the government
and the public about wrongdoing, abuse, mismanagement, and other
problems that they encounter. Public employee speech thus serves to
maintain a system of internal checks on government in addition to the
external checks imposed by legislatures, courts, and the public.16 This
system of internal checks is even more crucial as traditional checks of
executive power have grown weaker over time.17 Robust protection of
15
Clyde W. Summers, Employment At Will in the United States: The Divine Right of Employers,
3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000).
16
See infra Part IV.C.
17
See, e.g., THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW CONGRESS
IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 40–41 (2006) (describing the twentiethcentury rise in power of the executive, affecting Congress’s responsibility to check the executive and
“respond to its ascendant rival”); Brian D. Feinstein, Avoiding Oversight: Legislator Preferences and
Congressional Monitoring of the Administrative State, 8 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 23, 25 (2011) (“Congress
continues to grapple with the interrelated issues of how best to exert control over administrative
agencies and counter the President’s strengthened hand.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration,
114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2246, 2248 (2001) (acknowledging the power of the President in the “era of
presidential administration”).
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public employee speech thus has the potential to compensate for the
concomitant loss of monitoring by other branches and agents.
Part II surveys and critiques a century of public employee speech
doctrine. I show that ever since the Court’s 1968 high point in Pickering v.
Board of Education,18 public employees have seen their free speech rights
dwindle, the lowest point being the Court’s recent decision in Garcetti v.
Ceballos.19 Garcetti, I argue, has brought constitutional protection close to
its nineteenth-century level, when public employees enjoyed no
constitutional protection for their speech and were considered no different
than private employees.
Taking a sweeping view of developments in government organization,
Part III develops the public/private convergence thesis in three sections.
First, I interpret the retrenchment in public employee speech rights as an
undeclared attempt to equalize the speech rights of private employees with
those of public employees. The underlying reason for this convergence—
one which is rarely made explicit—is that despite lofty rhetoric, the
Supreme Court now sees little difference between the two. The Article
then seeks to understand the decline in public employee speech against the
background of two larger transformations in government work:
privatization and civil service reforms at the sub-national level.
Privatization and outsourcing by government suggest not only that firms
can perform tasks that were previously reserved for government, but that
there is no difference between private and public employees. Civil service
reforms at the sub-national level have either eliminated or eroded
traditional protections for public employees. Thousands of employees
have been converted to the status of employment at will, and several states
now hire only at-will employees, the paradigm of private sector
employment relations. Thus, whereas privatization is a movement from
government to market, civil service reforms are a movement from market
to government.
The Article connects these seemingly disparate phenomena and for the
first time links them to the declining protection of public employee speech.
It demonstrates how structural changes in government organization
generate constitutional implications. Privatization and outsourcing by the
government mean that the private sector is engaged in government work,
yet private sector employees do not enjoy constitutional protection when
they speak about their work. With fewer public employees performing
these jobs, there is a net loss of valuable speech that can inform the public
and government itself about the government. By stripping protections
from public employees and converting them to at-will status, civil service
18
19

391 U.S. 563 (1968).
547 U.S. 410 (2006).
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reforms create a chilling effect. Employees will be less likely to speak
about government and express valuable dissent if their job is on the line.
Part IV therefore rejects the public/private convergence by mounting
an argument in favor of public/private divergence. The importation of
market norms into government work, the loss of public service ethic, and
the erosion of a system of internal checks on government power overlook
the unique role of the state vis-à-vis the market and the unique role of
public employees, both in terms of their job duties and in terms of their
role in a democratic society that values transparency, accountability, and
dissent.
At times, the Court seems to be aware of the rationales privileging
public employee speech. Yet there is a mismatch between the First
Amendment values that support public employee speech, namely the
contribution to democratic self-government, and the doctrinal rules that the
Court has created to advance these values. Similarly, the Court
misapprehends how government bureaucracies operate by overlooking
social science research demonstrating that workplaces are already geared
toward suppressing dissent. Dissent levels, as determined by the Court, are
therefore suboptimal and bolster pre-existing silencing tendencies. Finally,
whereas the Court’s emphasis on disruption and efficiency as grounds to
suppress speech is the most explicit importation of private sector logic, it
overlooks how employers often overestimate the possibility of disruption
when they perceive challenges to their authority. The Court, on its part,
overestimates the possibility of being flooded with employee suits.
Protecting public employee speech also raises concerns. Such speech
may not be sufficiently valuable to warrant constitutional protection. Some
may argue that there are ample sources to acquire information about
government, making employee speech redundant. Moreover, protecting
such speech might cause disruptions in the government workplace and
generate inefficiencies that, on balance, militate against protection. Even
those who favor protection may believe that constitutional protection goes
too far given extant whistleblower statutes and common law safeguards
that purport to protect employee speech when it matters most. Others may
be troubled by the prospect of excessive judicial intervention in the
operation of the workplace. Part IV ends by discussing, and ultimately
rejecting, these objections.
Responding to the normative concerns, Part V elaborates on the
proposed project of public/private divergence. I offer two possible
directions for reform. The first proposal seeks to resolve the problems with
the Court’s jurisprudence by offering specific doctrinal reforms, the main
one being a return to the Pickering framework with several adjustments.
The second proposal focuses on the public workplace and on the possibility
of utilizing internal regulatory mechanisms to protect and encourage
valuable speech. While the first proposal is possible, it is unlikely to be
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realized in the near future given the Court’s composition. The second
proposal seeks to avoid costly and often inefficacious litigation, but it too
comes at price; namely, the pitfalls of self-regulation and the lack of
meaningful monitoring through judicial review. My main objective,
however, is to uncover the larger forces that shape public employee speech
doctrine and to embark on an alternative normative path.20
II. BACK TO THE PAST: A CENTURY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE SPEECH
A. The Competing Values
The First Amendment applies differently in the public workplace than
it does in public discourse. Whereas our speech is largely free from
government regulation as citizens, it is not unconstrained if we work for
the government. Although government generally may not impose content
and viewpoint based restrictions on speech, it can, as an employer, impose
such restrictions that are viewed as necessary for the promotion of
government’s own speech.21 The difficulty in public employment law
stems from the fact that government is occupying different roles, each with
corresponding rights and powers. As a sovereign it is significantly limited
in its control of speech, but as an employer it can demand that employees
perform their jobs, which includes control of their speech.22
But in controlling its employees’ speech to further its own mission,
government runs the risk of trampling on two expressive interests: those
employees have as speakers, and those society and government have as
listeners. The importance of public employee speech lies in its ability to
advance First Amendment values that contribute to republican government.
This speech increases government transparency by often revealing details
about government work that are otherwise unavailable or difficult to
obtain.23 Such speech can expose government waste, fraud, abuse, or other
illegalities, facilitating the public’s ability to hold government politically
20
At no point do I argue that current protections for private employee speech are optimal. Taking
the status of private employees as given, my objective is to prevent the slide in public employee speech
rights.
21
This is the government speech doctrine, which is a defense against government infringement of
free speech. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
22
See Robert C. Post, Subsidized Speech, 106 YALE L.J. 151, 164 (1996) (arguing that “[w]ithin
managerial domains, the state organizes its resources so as to achieve specified ends”); Paul M.
Secunda, Garcetti’s Impact on the First Amendment Speech Rights of Federal Employees, 7 FIRST
AMEND. L. REV. 117, 120 (2008) (“The government as sovereign generally may not punish citizens for
the content of their speech, but the government as employer may demand that employees do the job
they were hired to do, and insofar as effective performance of that job requires saying some things and
not others, it can control their speech.”).
23
See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 572 (1968) (“Teachers are, as a class, the
members of a community most likely to have informed and definite opinions as to how funds allotted to
the operation of the schools should be spent.”).
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24

accountable.
Finally, public employee speech facilitates dissent from
official policy. It introduces dissenting views of those who are part of the
policymaking process, often as enforcers and implementers. This is the
type of speech least likely to be heard inside and outside of government,
despite providing crucial insights about the management of government
programs and institutions. For employers, a climate where employees feel
safe to speak out about government policy not only improves intragovernment communication, but also informs government itself about
problems with particular policies. On this view, public employee speech
operates as a signaling mechanism for problems down the chain of
command. This is doubly important in light of the difficulty of expressing
opinions in hierarchical settings, which is the prevalent structure of
government organizations.
Thus, the position advanced in this Article is not that public employee
speech is valuable for autonomy, liberty, or marketplace of ideas
rationales, though it can be tangentially related to those. It is most
defensible when it can be justified on rationales of democratic selfgovernment. The unique institutional location of public employees—their
comparative advantage over ordinary citizens—makes them especially able
to contribute toward that end. On this view, constitutional protection is
justified both when the speech is expressed internally, in government, and
externally, outside government.
At the same time, protecting public employee speech can disrupt the
smooth operation of government. Employees may make false accusations,
misunderstand particular policies, or raise grievances that have little
constitutional value. Dissenting speech can undermine the government’s
ability to communicate a clear and coherent message and reduce the
government’s ability to control its institutions. The Court’s public
employee speech doctrine attempts to balance the conflicting interests.
Indeed, the competing interests explain the differential protection for
speech in work and non-work settings. They fail, however, to explain the
shift in protection over the past century. This Part traces the development
of public employee speech doctrine, arguing that the consistent decline in
constitutional protection should be viewed not only as a de facto return to
its nineteenth century level, when no protection was extended to such
speech, but also as part of a larger theme of converging the speech rights of
public employees with those of private employees.
B. The Doctrinal Landscape: 1892−2012
The origin of public employee speech doctrine dates back to Justice
Holmes in 1892, when he was serving on the Supreme Judicial Court of
24

See infra Part IV.C.
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Massachusetts. In McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, a policeman was
fired for engaging in political canvassing.26 Dismissing the policeman’s
suit, Holmes stated that “[the policeman] may have a constitutional right to
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”27 By
accepting public employment (much like private employment), the
policeman waived his constitutional rights and the city was free to impose
“any reasonable condition upon holding offices within its control.”28
The Holmesian conception was premised on the decoupling of the
government’s power as a sovereign and as an employer. What the
government could not do as a sovereign it could do as an employer.29
Holmes assumed that employers, not courts, best know how to manage
their organizations, and therefore, they should have discretion to control
their employees’ speech.30 McAuliffe thus introduced the rights/privilege
distinction; whatever constitutional rights individuals may have as citizens,
public employment is a “privilege” and may be subject to restrictions that
would otherwise be unconstitutional if applied to citizens generally.31
The rights/privilege distinction dominated into the 1960s,32 until its
repudiation in Pickering v. Board of Education, the high point of modern
public employee speech doctrine. In Pickering, a public school teacher
was fired after writing a letter to the editor of a local newspaper criticizing
the local board of education for supporting a series of tax referenda.33
Although the Court rejected the rights/privilege distinction,34 it recognized
that the state has important interests in regulating its employees’ speech.35
It therefore introduced a balancing test, balancing the interests of the public
employee, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern, and
25

29 N.E. 517 (Mass. 1892).
Id. at 517.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 518.
29
See id. at 517 (“[T]here is nothing in the constitution or the statute to prevent the city from
attaching obedience to [the rule at issue] as a condition to the office of policeman, and making it part of
the good conduct required.”). For a development of this point, see Randy J. Kozel, Reconceptualizing
Public Employee Speech, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 1007, 1029 (2005) (acknowledging that “the government
as sovereign regulator of private conduct is limited by the First Amendment in its ability to restrict
citizen speech, but when the government steps out of its role as sovereign and into its role as employer,
it transcends these limitations”).
30
Kozel, supra note 29, at 1031–32.
31
JOSEPH R. GRODIN ET AL., PUBLIC SECTOR EMPLOYMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 23 (2004).
32
The distinction began to unravel in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952). The
dissent from Justice Douglas, who was joined by Justice Black, dismissed the utility of the
employer/sovereign distinction, arguing that citizens should not forgo their constitutional rights in
virtue of their public employment. See id. at 508 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“I cannot for example find
in our constitutional scheme the power of a state to place its employees in the category of second-class
citizens by denying them freedom of thought and expression.”).
33
391 U.S. 563, 566 (1968).
34
Id. at 568–69.
35
Id. at 568.
26
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the interests of the state, as an employer, in promoting the effective
delivery of public services.36
Pickering represented a marked shift: from no protection under the
Holmesian regime, to the recognition that public employees play a valuable
role in informing the public of government conduct and are best positioned
to do so because of their access to governmental decision-making.37
However, Pickering did not specify what counts as speech on a matter of
public concern. In Connick v. Myers,38 the Court explained that “[w]hether
an employee’s speech addresses a matter of public concern must be
determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as
revealed by the whole record.”39 In Connick, an assistant district attorney,
upon learning that she would be transferred to a different office, circulated
a questionnaire to her colleagues asking about their experience with their
job transfers, including whether any worker was pressured to work in a
political campaign on behalf of a candidate supported by the office.40
Upholding her dismissal, the Court reasoned that the questionnaire touched
on matters of public concern in only a limited sense.41 Even though no
disruption was caused, the employer’s belief that there would be, coupled
with the absence of public concern, removed any possible constitutional
protection.42
The result of these two cases was the Connick/Pickering analysis.
First, the Court must determine if the speech relates to a matter of public
concern. If the answer is yes, then the speech is balanced against the
government’s countervailing interest in efficiency and non-disruption.
Connick thus made “public concern” a threshold issue,43 while failing to
define it.44

36

Id.
This was the formal end of the rights/privilege distinction, predicted by Professor William W.
Van Alstyne in an article he published one month prior to the Pickering decision. William W. Van
Alstyne, The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439,
1461–62 (1968).
38
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
39
Id. at 147–48.
40
Id. at 140–41.
41
Id. at 154.
42
Id.
43
See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 384 (1987) (making public concern a “threshold
question”); Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an Emerging First
Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1990) (asserting that although “Connick might be
seen as simply articulating what was implicit in Pickering . . . there is no doubt that Connick recast the
Pickering balance”).
44
See, e.g., Stephen Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on
Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43, 44 (1988) (examining decisions of the courts since Connick
to predict when an employee’s speech pertains to a public concern). This problem plagued lower court
cases that invoked the public concern test to deny constitutional protection. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro,
37
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Connick signaled a retreat from Pickering’s more expansive approach,
but it was not an aberration. In Mt. Healthy School District Board of
Education v. Doyle,45 the Court held that the burden was on the public
employee to prove that her speech was the motivating factor for
retaliation.46 To rebut the employee’s claim, the employer had to show that
the adverse action would have occurred regardless of the speech.47 This
made it easier for employers to retaliate against dissenting speech because
of the ease in concocting reasons for adverse action.48 Importantly, the
“motivating factor” test was imported from the private sector of
employment law litigation, where it was often applied in “mixed-motive”
discrimination cases.49 Then, in Waters v. Churchill,50 the Court
announced a broad rule of deference to the employer. In Waters, a nurse,
in a private conversation, criticized hospital policy that she believed placed
patient care at risk.51 The Court held that it would defer to the employer
when it made a sensible prediction about likely disruption, even on issues
of public concern.52
Mt. Healthy and Waters reveal how the Court views public employees
and the organizations in which they work. By granting public managers
broad discretion to limit individual rights, as long as those limitations
further government’s pursuit of efficient management,53 the Court
expressed a view of government organizations that is close, if not identical,
to private firms, where constitutional rights cannot be invoked because of
the absence of state action. Despite acknowledging that “[g]overnment
employees are often in the best position to know what ails the agencies for
which they work,”54 the Court privileged employer interests and the
Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 20–21
n.95 (1987) (citing cases).
45
429 U.S. 274 (1977).
46
Id. at 287.
47
Id. at 285.
48
See, e.g., Michael L. Wells, Section 1983, the First Amendment, and Public Employee Speech:
Shaping the Right to Fit the Remedy (and Vice Versa), 35 GA. L. REV. 939, 1012 (2001) (noting that the
Mt. Healthy test “creates the risk that the defendant will prevail whenever some other reason is
sufficient to justify the adverse employment action”).
49
See TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS LIMITATIONS
224–25 (2007) (noting that under Title VII, “discriminatory intent can be a ‘motivating factor’ . . . even
if the trier of fact ultimately concludes that the employer would have made the ‘same decision’ even
had it not been motivated by the prohibited consideration”).
50
511 U.S. 661 (1994).
51
Id. at 664–65. In an earlier case, the Court held that private conversations can also be
constitutionally protected. See Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 415–16 (1979)
(reasoning that a teacher’s private criticism to her principal regarding the school’s desegregation policy
was a matter of public concern).
52
Waters, 511 U.S. at 673.
53
Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment
in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1234 (1997).
54
Waters, 511 U.S. at 674.
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employer’s perception of the employee’s speech, even if the employer is
mistaken about what the employee said.55
One consequence of Waters allowed managers to make ad hoc
dismissals without employees violating any regulations, which was
equivalent to the situation of private sector at-will employees.56 A second
consequence was the focus on disruption. When speech disrupts the
workplace, it is not protected, yet the Court did not explain what counts as
disruption and why it should be guarded against. In fact, the public
employee speech cases are remarkable in that the Court consistently
upholds employers’ actions even when no disruption occurred.
Presumably disruption is negatively associated with the delivery of public
services, and is thus linked with efficiency. But rather than examine
whether disruption occurred, or whether such disruption can be beneficial,
the Court defers to what the employer believes might happen.57 This
resonates with the Holmesian model, which assumed that employers, not
the court, best know how to manage their organizations, and it is in line
with the private sector rule assigning the employer the financial risk for
success of the business.
To be sure, public employees occasionally prevail, but in interesting
ways—notably when the speech does not take place on the job and is not
job-related. In United States v. National Treasury Employees Union
(NTEU),58 the Court struck down a provision that prohibited federal
employees from accepting honoraria for speech-related activity such as
public speaking or writing articles.59 As the Court noted, the activity for
which the employees had received payments concerned matters that were
not related to the employees’ official duties and were not paid by groups
connected to employees’ official responsibilities; hence, there was no
disruption to government operations.60 NTEU reveals, however, the gap
between the Court’s professed ideals and the doctrinal reality put in place
to realize them. Although the Court insists that the raison d’être of public
employee speech is providing information about government conduct,61 it
is most generous in First Amendment protection where employees are the
55
As the Court reasoned, employers often rely on hearsay, which would make subjecting
employees to a judicial-type scrutiny of the truth unreasonable. Id. at 676.
56
For a discussion of private sector employee speech rights, see Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech
and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. 101, 117–18 (1995).
57
The deference is often explained as a reluctance to interfere in the internal management of other
institutions and is grounded in courts’ institutional limitations and agencies’ superior expertise. Gia B.
Lee, First Amendment in Government Institutions and Programs, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1691, 1717–23
(2009).
58
513 U.S. 454 (1995).
59
See id. at 457 (striking down part of the Ethics Reform Act of 1989).
60
Id. at 472–73.
61
See San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 82 (2004) (“Were [public employees] not able to speak on
these matters, the community would be deprived of informed opinions on important public issues.”).
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most removed from their jobs and institutional locations.
Like other speech-protective cases, NTEU’s holding has come under
pressure. In San Diego v. Roe, the Court upheld a dismissal for off duty
speech (in this case, a police officer filming himself in sexual acts while
wearing a generic police uniform) that exploited the government’s image
and thus “brought the mission of the employer and the professionalism of
its officers into serious disrepute.”62 Roe’s speech was harmful not
because it compromised his ability to do his job, but because it reflected
poorly on government as a whole. In other words, the Court narrowed the
scope of protected speech when that speech could cause the government to
be perceived as endorsing the employee’s message because of its
association with the employee.63 Notice again, the resemblance to the
private sector rule of at-will employment that would ordinarily not bar
retaliatory action because of the employer’s need to maintain a certain
image and reputation.64
Despite this decline in protection, public employees still had speech
rights when they spoke about issues of public concern, unless those were
outweighed by disruption and efficiency considerations. That principle,
however, received a serious blow in Garcetti v. Ceballos, where the Court
held that speech made “pursuant to . . . official duties” receives no
constitutional protection.65 Ceballos, a deputy district attorney in Los
Angeles County, responded to an inquiry by a defense attorney who
planned to challenge a search warrant.66 Upon investigating, Ceballos
concluded that the affidavit submitted by the police to secure the warrant
contained serious misrepresentations.67 He recommended the case be
dismissed, but his superiors decided to proceed.68
Ceballos was
subpoenaed to testify on behalf of the defense, and although the judge
accepted his claims about misrepresentation, the case was allowed to
proceed on other grounds.69 Subsequently, Ceballos claimed that he was
subject to a series of retaliatory measures.70
62

Id. at 81.
See Helen Norton, Constraining Public Employee Speech: Government’s Control of Its
Workers’ Speech to Protect Its Own Expression, 59 DUKE L.J. 1, 16 (2009) (“[C]ourts increasingly
hold that government may also control even its workers’ off-duty speech to protect its own expressive
interests.”).
64
See, e.g., BRUCE BARRY, SPEECHLESS: THE EROSION OF FREE EXPRESSION IN THE AMERICAN
WORKPLACE 140–41 (2007) (describing a case of termination based on off-work, non-work-related
speech).
65
547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
66
Id. at 413–14.
67
Id. at 414.
68
Id.
69
Id. at 414–15.
70
Id. at 415. Those retaliatory measures “included reassignment from his calendar deputy
position to a trial deputy position, transfer to another courthouse, and denial of a promotion.” Id.
63
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In a 5–4 decision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court argued that
the operative distinction was whether the employee was speaking as a
citizen or as an employee.71 Pickering, the Court said, only protected the
right of the public employee to speak as a citizen on a matter of public
concern, 72 but Ceballos spoke as an employee.73 A person can speak either
as an employee or as a citizen, but not both, no matter the seriousness or
gravity of the issue or the intensity of the public’s interest. Consequently,
when public employees make statements “pursuant to their official duties”
they are not speaking as citizens for First Amendment purposes, and are
therefore not protected from employer discipline.74
Although the Court could have grounded its decision in concerns about
political accountability, the heart of its reasoning was couched in economic
terms that relied on private-sector logic. The Court reasoned that the
speech does not belong to the employee and therefore the employer cannot
infringe upon any liberties the employee would have enjoyed as a private
citizen. The speech belongs to the government because it commissioned it
from the employee, i.e., paid for it.75
Troubled by the elasticity of Pickering/Connick balancing, the Court
created a bright-line rule that would preempt a wide range of statements
from constitutional protection.76 In the course of doing so, however, four
problems emerged. First, the Court failed to define what counts as
speaking “pursuant to official duties,” making the term open to employer
manipulation.77 Indeed, lower courts are divided on what “official duties”
means, putting to rest the Court’s desire to end litigation and excessive
judicial intervention.78
71

Id. at 417–18.
Id. at 418.
73
Id. at 421–22.
74
Id. at 421.
75
See id. at 421–22 (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s
professional responsibilities does not infringe any liberties the employee might have enjoyed as a
private citizen. It simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created.”).
76
See, e.g., Barry P. McDonald, The Emerging Oversimplifications of the Government Speech
Doctrine: From Substantive Content to a “Jurisprudence of Labels,” 2010 BYU L. REV. 2071, 2091
(explaining how the Court veered from the previous balancing of interests analysis); see also Charles
W. “Rocky” Rhodes, Public Employee Speech Rights Fall Prey to an Emerging Doctrinal Formalism,
15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1173, 1203 & n.216 (2007) (noting Justice Kennedy’s general objections
to formalism and distaste for decisions where a “categorical bright-line rule prevail[s] over interest
balancing”).
77
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 431 n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I am pessimistic enough to expect
that one response to the Court’s holding will be moves by government employers to expand stated job
descriptions to include more official duties and so exclude even some currently protectable speech from
First Amendment purview.”). In response, the Court said the examination would be a practical one and
guard against self-serving definitions. Id. at 424–25 (majority opinion).
78
See, e.g., Scott R. Bauries & Patrick Schach, Coloring Outside the Lines: Garcetti v. Ceballos
in the Federal Appellate Courts, 262 EDUC. L. REP. 357, 358 (2011) (“[T]he scope of the Garcetti
72
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Second, even if the interpretive question of official duties were
resolved, Garcetti fails to protect employees whose job duties are to report
on governmental wrongdoing. Indeed, the post-Garcetti landscape has
enabled dismissals of many such employees.79 This is a Catch-22. If
employees fail to speak, they risk termination for not doing their job; but if
they do their job and report wrongdoing, they risk termination for that very
act.80
Third, speech on matters of public concern is no longer protected if it
was made pursuant to official duties. Garcetti protects speech depending
on the context in which it was made, whereas prior to the ruling the Court
focused on whether the statement was on a matter of public concern.81 For
example, in Vose v. Kliment,82 a police officer reported internally to his
superiors on the misconduct of other officers and was eventually forced to
resign.83 Relying on Garcetti, the Seventh Circuit denied the officer’s First
Amendment claim, insinuating that had the officer spoken externally to the
media, outside his “official duties,” his statements may have been
protected.84
exemption has apparently caused some confusion in the lower courts.”); Christine Elzer, The “Official
Duties” Puzzle: Lower Courts’ Struggle with First Amendment Protection for Public Employees After
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 69 U. PITT. L. REV. 367, 368 (2007) (“The lower courts’ efforts to apply
Garcetti’s categorical holding to various fact scenarios have resulted in some puzzling outcomes that
seem to have raised more questions than Garcetti purported to settle.”).
79
See, e.g., Carter v. Inc. Vill. of Ocean Beach, 415 F. App’x 290, 293 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding
that reporting police officer misconduct up the chain of command is part of an official duty); Bonn v.
City of Omaha, 623 F.3d 587, 588 (8th Cir. 2010) (upholding the dismissal of a public safety auditor
who published a report that was critical of the police’s interactions with the black community); Green
v. Barrett, 226 F. App’x 883, 884, 886 (11th Cir. 2007) (upholding the dismissal of a jailer who
testified that prison conditions were unsafe); Battle v. Bd. of Regents for Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 763 (11th
Cir. 2006) (upholding the dismissal of a financial aid officer who reported on noncompliance with
grants); DePrado v. City of Miami, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1346 (S.D. Fla. 2006) (finding that testifying
at a grand jury is part of a police officer’s official duties).
80
The Supreme Court recently passed up opportunities to resolve this Catch-22 when it denied
certiorari in Jackler v. Byrne and Bowie v. Maddox. See Jackler v. Byrne, 658 F.3d 225, 245 (2d Cir.
2011) (splitting on whether employees have First Amendment rights when refusing to file false reports
ordered by their superiors), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1634 (2012); Bowie v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122,
1133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (declining to address the question of whether an employee had a First
Amendment right to refuse to sign an allegedly false affidavit as ordered by his superior), cert. denied,
132 S. Ct. 1636 (2012).
81
The Garcetti approach is the opposite of Givhan v. Western Line Consolidated School Dist.,
439 U.S. 410 (1979), which held that public concern, not context, is controlling. See id. at 414 (stating
that the rule to be derived from Pickering and Mt. Healthy is not dependent on those views being
expressed publicly or privately).
82
506 F.3d 565 (7th Cir. 2007).
83
Id. at 566–67.
84
Id. at 569, 572. This is far from settled, however, since employees have been disciplined for
speaking to the media, even if it was in their capacity as “citizens.” Robert E. Drechsel, The Declining
First Amendment Rights of Government News Sources: How Garcetti v. Ceballos Threatens the Flow of
Newsworthy Information, 16 COMM. L. & POL’Y. 129, 147 (2011).
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Although context matters for balancing, the Court now treats it as
outcome-determinative.
The problem is that the internal/external
distinction ignores workplace realities. Sometimes employees report
internally and sometimes externally, for example where the superiors
themselves are complicit in the wrongdoing or where they share the views
of those the employee speaks against. The decision how to report is
contextual and depends on the severity of the wrongdoing or disagreement,
the fear of retaliation, the organizational culture, the employee’s status, and
a host of other factors not included in the Court’s rigid formulation.86
Ironically, going outside may create much more disruption than internal
reporting, so the Court’s desire to prevent disruption is undermined by its
insistence that going outside is more likely to warrant the “citizen” label.87
Finally, Garcetti leads to situations where the same content is
protected when made by an employee removed from the issue (since the
speech will not be pursuant to an official duty), while not protected when
made by an official who is acting pursuant to an official duty. Yet officials
who are not acting pursuant to an official duty are less likely to know about
the issue and are therefore less likely to speak in the first place. In effect,
Garcetti can stifle dissent completely because it prevents the people who
are most informed from speaking out. While employees who are not close
to the issue may be able to speak “as citizens,” the value of their speech
will be lower. Therefore, there is a mismatch between the First
Amendment values that support public employee speech and the doctrinal
rules that the Court has created to advance these values.
C. From Holmes to Holmes
Where do we stand today? It turns out we stand close to Justice
Holmes in McAuliffe in 1892. True, Pickering repudiated the idea that
government employment is a privilege and therefore can be conditioned by
terms that are otherwise unconstitutional. But Pickering, it turns out, was
the aberration. In almost every case since, the Court has narrowed the
constitutional protections it afforded public employees. Indeed, while
85
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983) (“Whether an employee’s speech
addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given
statement, as revealed by the whole record.”).
86
See, e.g., Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, Decentralized Enforcement in Organizations: An
Experimental Approach, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 165, 166 (2008) (presenting findings of a study that
focuses on whistleblowing and predicts “the conditions under which individuals confront illegalities
they witness in their workplace”). The internal/external distinction builds on economist Albert
Hirschman’s work on voice and exit. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND
LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970).
87
See Davis v. McKinney, 518 F.3d 304, 313 (5th Cir. 2008) (raising concerns up the chain of
command at the workplace about job duties constitutes speech undertaken in the course of performing
an official duty).
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Garcetti was subject to much scholarly criticism, that literature overlooked
the fact that Garcetti simply confirmed a trend that was almost forty years
in the making.88
To see the de-facto return to the Holmesian model, let us compare the
speech rights public employees had during three different periods.89
TABLE 1
Public
Employee
Speech

Off the job,
non-job related
speech

Off the job, job
related speech

Off the job,
speech on
matters of
public concern

1892–1968
McAuliffe

Not protected

Undecided

Not protected

1968–2004
Pickering,
Connick,
NTEU

2006–Present
San Diego v.
Roe, Garcetti

Protected
(NTEU)

Protected
(NTEU), unless
speech is
negatively
associated with
public employer
(San Diego v.
Roe)

Pickering
balance

Not if part of
official duties.
Otherwise
Pickering
balance.

Pickering
balance

Not if part of
official duties.
Otherwise
Pickering
balance.

88
For criticisms of Garcetti, see Cynthia Estlund, Harmonizing Work and Citizenship: A Due
Process Solution to a First Amendment Problem, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 144–53; Sheldon H.
Nahmod, Public Employee Speech, Categorical Balancing and § 1983: A Critique of Garcetti v.
Ceballos, 42 U. RICH. L. REV. 561 (2008); Rhodes, supra note 76; Secunda, supra note 22; Julie A.
Wenell, Note, Garcetti v. Ceballos: Stifling the First Amendment in the Public Workplace, 16 WM. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 623 (2007).
89
Paul Secunda believes that the reemergence of the rights/privilege distinction is attributable to
the Court’s understanding of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, viewing government employment
similarly to the government choosing to fund one speech activity over another. Secunda, supra note
14, at 913–14. I agree with Secunda’s interpretation, but this Article advances a broader argument for
the reemergence of the distinction.
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Public
Employee
Speech

1892–1968
McAuliffe

1968–2004
Pickering,
Connick,
NTEU

2006–Present
San Diego v.
Roe, Garcetti

On the job, nonjob related
speech

Undecided;
likely not
protected

Not protected
(Connick)

Not protected
(Connick)

On the job, jobrelated speech
not on matters
of public
concern

Not protected

Not protected
(Connick)

Not protected
(Connick)

On the job
speech on
matters of
public concern

Not protected

Pickering
balance

Not if part of
official duties.
Otherwise
Pickering
balance

Speech that is
the job,
regardless of
where it was
spoken

Undecided

Undecided

Not protected
(Garcetti)

Today, public employees have no constitutional protection for speech
pursuant to official duties.90 Such speech can be interpreted broadly to
encompass speech that otherwise would have benefited from a Pickering
analysis—now precluded as a threshold matter. Lack of protection is
exacerbated by cases such as Mt. Healthy v. Doyle and Waters v. Churchill,
which stand for the proposition that courts should be deferential to
employers’ decisions even if the speech raises matters of public concern.91
The overall decline in constitutional protection raises four problems,
three of which have already been identified. First, protection is granted
based on whether the employee spoke as a “citizen” or as an “employee.”92
90

Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S 410, 421 (2006).
United States v. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 492 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (“In conducting
this balance, we consistently have given substantial weight to government employers’ reasonable
predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved was on a matter of public concern.”).
92
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
91
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Despite past language recognizing the duality, today’s Court does not
believe that the two can co-exist. Second, the Court has embraced the
internal/external distinction, where speech outside the job is likely to
warrant the “citizen” label and hence receive more protection.94 This
results in under-protection of valuable speech from the perspective of the
First Amendment. Third, the Court understands disruption and efficiency
in terms that ignore whether disruption actually occurred and whether
efficiency was actually compromised.95 Finally, even though each public
employee case dealt with a different type of employee (teacher, nurse,
police officer, prosecutor, etc.),96 the Court assumes that all public
employees are similarly situated, that each institution should be governed
by the same rules, and implicitly, that each institution seeks the same goals.
This doctrinal uniformity ignores government’s institutional diversity. I
return to these problems in Part V.
III. PUBLIC/PRIVATE CONVERGENCE
What accounts for the decline in public employee speech rights? This
Part unfolds in three sections, maintaining that the decline should be
viewed in light of the public/private convergence thesis. First, I argue that
the Court has been scaling back constitutional protections because it has
implicitly come to view public employees as private employees for
purposes of speech. Second, I maintain that the erosion in employee
speech rights is but one aspect of a general convergence between public
sector employees and private sector employees. This convergence is
driven by increased government privatization, outsourcing, and various
state civil service reforms. The Court’s public employee speech doctrine,
while not explicitly a part of this convergence, nevertheless reflects the
conception that government employees should be treated like private sector
employees. Third, I show how these developments result in less speech
and less protected speech. To be clear, I am not making a causal claim that
because of privatization and civil service reforms the Court altered its
public employee speech doctrine. My claim is that there is a correlation
between these phenomena because they are driven by the same underlying
93
See City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 429 U.S. 167,
176 n.11 (1976) (recognizing that teachers can speak both as citizens and employees).
94
The strongest evidence for this is NTEU, 513 U.S. at 454.
95
Professor Kozel has argued that the disruption test constitutionalizes a “heckler’s veto,” since
the speech right becomes “dependent on the likely reaction of co-workers and the public to the
employee’s speech.” Kozel, supra note 29, at 1019; see also Randy J. Kozel, Free Speech and Parity:
A Theory of Public Employee Rights, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1985, 2019 (2012) (“Through its
contemplation of scenarios in which the disruption caused by speech provides a lawful basis for
discipline, the Pickering test can be understood as constitutionalizing a ‘heckler’s veto’ for
controversial expressions.”).
96
See supra Part II.B.
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economic logic. This correlation is strengthened when we consider that:
(a) the moves I describe happened around the same time; and (b)
proponents of privatization and civil reforms often employ the same
language that is used by the Court in its public employee decisions, namely
the emphasis on efficiency, managerial flexibility and control, and office
performance. These similarities suggest that the parallels between public
employee doctrine and governmental organization are not accidental.
A. The Equalization of Public and Private Employee Speech
Because the Constitution only protects against state action,97 private
employees have no constitutional speech rights.98 The background rule for
employment relations in the private sector is employment at will. Briefly
stated, employers have the right to fire their employees at will, with no
notice, for good or bad reasons, or for no reasons at all.99 Employment at
will stresses employers’ property interest in the workplace.100 Employers
assume risks that are entailed in a competitive market, and correlatively the
law grants them discretion to manage their businesses as they see fit, albeit
with some exceptions.101 The rationale undergirding employment at will is
that the employer owns the job along with the property right to control its
conditions and the type of people who fill it. Although the employment at
will rule has been eroded by statutes and common law exceptions that give
employees greater protection from retaliation,102 it is still the background
rule and the prevailing ideological norm.103 Common law and statutory
deviations from the rule are the exceptions that are superimposed on the
dominant at-will paradigm.
The public policy exception is a paradigmatic example. The exception
prohibits adverse employer action that contradicts public policy. It mainly
protects private employees who serve on juries, file claims about
97

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
The Court did extend some First Amendment protections to independent contractors. See infra
Part III.C.
99
While the origins of the rule are contested, most courts usually cite Payne v. Western & Atlantic
Railroad Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 518 (1884). For various explanations, see generally Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976); Matthew W. Finkin,
The Bureaucratization of Work: Employer Policies and Contract Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 733.
100
It should be noted that a sizable minority of public sector employees are employed on an atwill basis. Estlund, supra note 56, at 130.
101
See, e.g., Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (2006) (prohibiting forms
of employment discrimination).
102
See, e.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment-At-Will: The Impending Death of a Doctrine, 37
AM. BUS. L.J. 653 (2000) (discussing statutes and common law exceptions that erode the employment
at will rule); Gary E. Murg & Clifford Scharman, Employment At Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm
the Rule?, 23 B.C. L. REV. 329 (1982) (discussing exceptions to the employment at will rule).
103
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009)
(presenting the at-will rule as the default rule in employment relations).
98
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workplace injuries, refuse to commit illegal acts, and report certain
violations to public authorities.104 The exception protects speech, though
mostly speech resembling whistle-blowing rather than dissenting speech
more generally. However, the exception has been stingily applied and
circumscribed.105 In most courts, the exception applies only where the
public policy is clearly expressed in a statute or a constitutional provision,
and sometimes even that is insufficient.106 Some courts require that the
policy be stated in the particular state’s law instead of a federal statute.107
Courts have tended to apply the exception to health and safety issues, so
speech critical of workplace issues unrelated to health and safety tends not
to receive protection.108 For example, employees who reported potential
embezzlement, theft, and false record keeping to their superiors have not
received protection because the conduct complained of was confined to
internal affairs, and thus did not affect public policy.109
Private sector unionization alleviates some of these concerns.
Collective bargaining agreements guarantee just cause proceedings,
including a hearing before a neutral arbiter. But these protections are
underscored by the low number of unionized employees—currently around
seven percent of the private workforce.110 Notably, private employees who
benefit from just cause proceedings are not immune from speech-related
retaliatory actions. Collective bargaining agreements guarantee a fair
procedure prior to termination, but they are likely to be unavailing when
104

Summers, supra note 15, at 70–71.
See, e.g., Lauren Edelman et al., Professional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of
Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 47, 47 (1992) (introducing their findings that the perceived
threat from wrongful discharge suits is much greater than the chances they will succeed); Cynthia L.
Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1657 (1996)
(arguing that “the at-will presumption continues to operate within the realm of wrongful discharge
protections . . . [and] continues to surround and undermine each of those protections”).
106
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 4.02 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009)
(stating that an employer is subject to liability for disciplining an employee when the employee engages
in activity that directly furthers a substantial public policy). Although Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance
Co., 721 F.2d 894, 900 (3d Cir. 1983), applied First Amendment norms to a private employment
dispute, subsequent federal and state courts refused to follow its holding that constitutional norms
govern a public policy exception without state action. RICHARD A. BALES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING
EMPLOYMENT LAW 89–90 (2007).
107
Summers, supra note 15, at 73.
108
See id. at 73–74 (describing cases).
109
Id. at 74 & n.49; see also Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373, 380 (Cal. 1988)
(finding that public policy did not prohibit an employer from discharging an employee who reported
suspected embezzlement); Donahue v. Schwegman, Lundberg, Woessner & Kluth P.A., 586 N.W.2d
811, 815 (Minn. App. 1998) (finding that the constructive discharge of an employee who reported
potentially illegal payroll deductions was not prohibited because “[a] law firm’s payroll deduction
practice did not raise public interest concerns”); Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp. 448 N.E.2d 86,
89–90 (N.Y. 1983) (declining, as a matter of public policy, to create a cause of action for wrongful
discharge where an employee reported the suspected falsification of financial records).
110
Union Members Summary, BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.bls.gov/news.rele
ase/union2.nr0.htm.
105
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there is no underlying substantive speech right or when the public policy
exception has been narrowly construed. The same holds true for public
sector employees who benefit from just cause proceedings that are likely to
be unavailing when there is no underlying substantive right.
Most speech-related protections, however, are found in federal and
state whistleblower statutes.111 These protections improved the status of
private employees, making them more like public employees. However,
federal protections for whistleblowers depend on the existence of a statute
that addresses a particular problem.112 Problems of enforcement have
plagued these provisions from being realized to their full extent.113 For
federal employees, there is the Whistleblower Protection Act,114 whose
enforcement has been partial and lacking.115 Other speech-related claims
fare no better. Bush v. Lucas116 held that federal employees cannot bring a
Bivens suit117 for First Amendment violations since the federal statutory

111
See generally STEPHEN M. KOHN, CONCEPTS AND PROCEDURES IN WHISTLEBLOWER LAW
(2001) (describing state and federal protections).
112
See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a) (2012) (protecting
whistleblowers who participate in proceedings arising under the statute); National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (2006) (same); Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623(d)
(2006) (same); Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (2006) (same); Federal Surface
Mining Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1293(a) (2006) (same); Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a)
(2006) (same); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (2006) (same).
113
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-362, WHISTLEBLOWER
PROTECTION: ACTIONS NEEDED TO IMPROVE DOD’S MILITARY WHISTLEBLOWER REPRISAL PROGRAM
13–23 (2012) (discussing weakness in the whistle blower reprisal program); U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-722, WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION: SUSTAINED MANAGEMENT
ATTENTION NEEDED TO ADDRESS LONG-STANDING PROGRAM WEAKNESSES 14–37 (2010) (discussing
weaknesses that the office found in the whistleblower protection program); Estlund, supra note 105, at
1673 (discussing other difficulties of enforcement); Richard Moberly, Protecting Whistleblowers by
Contract, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 982 (2008) (discussing the varied nuanced factors that contribute to
the ineffectiveness of the various whistleblower protections); Richard E. Moberly, Unfulfilled
Expectations: An Empirical Analysis of Why Sarbanes-Oxley Whistleblowers Rarely Win, 49 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 65, 129, 150–52 (2007) [hereinafter Unfulfilled Expectations] (arguing that
administrative decision makers strictly construe, and in some cases, misapply Sarbanes-Oxley’s
protections creating a significant disadvantage to employees).
114
Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2012)).
115
See, e.g., Terry Morehead Dworkin, SOX and Whistleblowing, 105 MICH. L. REV. 1757, 1766
(2007) (noting that since 1984 only one out of one-hundred-twenty whistleblower appeals to the
Federal Circuit has been successful); Jamie Sasser, Silenced Citizens: The Post-Garcetti Landscape for
Public Sector Employees Working in National Security, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 759, 790 (2007) (“From
1999 to 2005, only two out of thirty whistleblower claims prevailed before the Merit Systems
Protection Board; from 1995 to 2005, only one out of ninety-six claims prevailed before the Federal
Circuit.”).
116
462 U.S. 367 (1983).
117
See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 389
(1971) (creating a federal damages remedy vindicating violations of constitutional rights by federal
officials).

24

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

118

remedial scheme is comprehensive.
However, an examination of this
statutory remedial scheme, which also covers federal whistleblowers,
reveals that no employee speech claim has succeeded in the Merit System
Protection Board or the Federal Circuit—the bodies charged with
addressing these claims.119
At the state level, speech protections are found in whistleblower
statutes, which vary widely according to the type of whistleblower
protected, the appropriate recipient of the report, the subject of protected
whistle-blowing, the motive of the whistleblower, the quality of the
evidence offered by the whistleblower, and the remedies offered.120 It is
important to note, however, that most states do not have comprehensive
common law or statutory schemes to protect whistleblowers. Sixteen states
and the District of Columbia offer no protection at all, for either public or
private employees.121
To sum up, not only is there a lack of uniformity that results in
uncertainty and inconsistencies across jurisdictions, but the speech-related
protections are also narrowly construed—focusing mostly on speech
related to gross misconduct, fraud, corruption, and illegality. Such
protections do not cover private sector analogues of Myers or Ceballos, and
they rarely cover critical and dissenting speech that does not amount to
straightforward whistle-blowing. The private sector analog of Bryan
Gonzalez would similarly not be protected under these statutory and
common law arrangements.
This doctrinal reality places public and private employees on very
similar footing. Indeed, as early as 1977, only nine years after the height
of protection in Pickering, the Court suggested that “[t]he uniqueness of
public employment is not in the employees nor in the work performed; the
uniqueness is in the special character of the employer.”122 As will be
discussed below, this statement is problematic,123 but given the decrease in
speech rights in the public sector and the relative similarity to private
employees, it is unclear that the Court even maintains the position that
public employers are differently situated.
118
Bush, 462 U.S. at 371, 388–90; see also id. at 385 n.25 (providing examples of legislation
including the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978).
119
Paul M. Secunda, Whither the Pickering Rights of Federal Employees?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV.
1101, 1131, 1142 (2008).
120
BARRY, supra note 64, at 57; Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, The State
of State Whistleblower Protection, 38 AM. BUS. L.J. 99, 107–08 (2000); see also Garcetti v. Ceballos,
547 U.S. 410, 440 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (commenting on state whistleblower laws).
121
State Whistleblower Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/labor/state-whistleblower-laws.aspx (last visited Aug. 28, 2013).
122
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 230 (1977) (emphasis omitted) (quoting Clyde
W. Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Governmental Decisionmaking, 44 U. CIN. L.
REV. 669, 670 (1975)).
123
See infra Part IV.
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Of course, public sector employment is not identical to private sector
employment. Yet when it comes to speech, the Court has embraced a logic
and rhetoric that makes it hard to distinguish the two. According to
Garcetti, employees do not have speech rights in their job because the
employer commissioned that speech.124 The government has bought the
speech, and without the government there would be no speech in the first
place.125 In other words, the government is claiming the speech of its
employees as its own merely in virtue of the employment relationship.
Although this is an iteration of the government speech doctrine, which
holds that the government does not have to maintain viewpoint neutrality
when it speaks to advance its views,126 it is also no different from the
accepted proposition that the private employer owns the employee’s speech
because she is paying her wages.
Similarly, public employee speech cases emphasize the need for office
efficiency, but the Court understands efficiency in terms imported from the
private sector. It equates efficiency with hierarchy and compliance with
authority.127 To be efficient is to do what the employer has demanded or
commissioned, with as much or as little discretion as the employer desires.
The counterpart to efficiency is the Court’s elevation of non-disruption to a
value worthy of judicial protection—just as in the private sector, a
dissenting employee threatens office harmony and jeopardizes the
employer’s ability to conduct business in the way she desires. The
trajectory of the public employee speech cases then mimics the conditions
of private employment by giving public employers the same control held
by private sector employers. The government workplace is construed as a
“business” that, while not motivated by profit concerns, has come to reflect
some of the same modes of thought.
As Professor Elizabeth Dale observed in her analysis of Garcetti, the
Court has embraced the idea of “management rights,” a familiar concept in
private employment, where managers have the right to define office

124

Garcetti, 547 U.S at 421–22.
See id. (“Restricting speech that owes its existence to a public employee’s professional
responsibilities . . . simply reflects the exercise of employer control over what the employer itself has
commissioned or created . . . . When he went to work and performed the tasks he was paid to perform,
Ceballos acted as a government employee.”).
126
See, e.g., Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass’n, 544 U.S. 550, 559 (2005) (“[C]ompelled funding
of government speech does not alone raise First Amendment concerns.”); Rosenberger v. Rector &
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995) (“[W]hen the government appropriates public funds
to promote a particular policy of its own it is entitled to say what it wishes.”).
127
See Massaro, supra note 44, at 51–52 (discussing how courts construe public employment in
strictly Weberian terms); see also Robert G. Vaughn, Ethics in Government and the Vision of Public
Service, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 417, 424 (1990) (“Hierarchical management authority within an
agency became identified closely with the vision of public service.”).
125
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missions and the means to accomplish these ends.
By incorporating the
management rights approach, Dale notes that public agencies can now
silence employees, yet she takes comfort in the extensive body of law that
constrains managers by invoking past practices in the workplace,
unionization, collective bargaining, and legislation.129 But given the partial
protection of legislation, the relatively small number of public employees
who are unionized,130 and the procedural rather than substantive protection
of collective bargaining agreements, there may be little room for comfort.
After leveling down public employee voice to that of private sector
employees, the constraining mechanisms on managerial discretion are
partial, at best.
The Court’s decisions since Pickering have bolstered the inherent
advantage public employers enjoy when it comes to controlling speech,
essentially equating them to private employers. Public employees are
increasingly punished for behavior on the grounds of efficiency, nondisruption, and protection of the employer’s image—values that are readily
invoked in the private sphere. Like the lack of protection in the private
sphere, the Court views public officials as cogs in the service of the
government machinery rather than agents who might serve a constitutional
function.
None of this is to say that guarding from disruption and maintaining
efficiency are not valuable goals in the public workplace.131 It doesn’t
follow, however, that they should be similarly construed. The Court
understands efficiency as rule following and compliance with superiors’
orders, yet the Court also suggests that its decisions promote the efficient
delivery of government services. The problem is that the two are not
necessarily the same because compliance with orders will not always result
in the optimal delivery of government services. A police officer who
speaks about misconduct is in all likelihood contributing to the efficient
delivery of government services, even if his behavior causes some
disruption in the chain of command. The same goes for the value of nondisruption. A government office can be underperforming or managed
poorly, but still be running smoothly, albeit incompetently. Speaking out
against mismanagement or incompetence will inevitably cause disruption,

128
Elizabeth Dale, Employee Speech & Management Rights: A Counterintuitive Reading of
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 29 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 175, 213 (2008).
129
Id. at 214.
130
Union membership among public sector employees stood at 35.9% in 2012. Union Members
Summary, supra note 110.
131
The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 provides that an agency may take adverse action against
an employee “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service.” 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a)
(2012).
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but such disruption would usually be valuable and welcome.
The Court
is thus conflating deference to authority with efficiency. Not only does this
equate efficiency with managerial discretion, it elevates a nonconstitutional value to a level worthy of constitutional protection without
examining the costs of equating the government to a private actor.
More importantly, although economic efficiency is undoubtedly crucial
in a competitive market, it is less clear that it plays (or should play) a
similar role in the governance of public institutions that do not operate in a
for-profit competitive environment. The notion that government must be
efficient is, after all, in tension with two basic themes of constitutional
governance: (1) that government should operate fairly and equitably and
consider all relevant viewpoints prior to making a decision;133 and (2) that
conflict results in more voice and more information, that extensive
deliberation is a virtue, not a vice, and that the Constitution has
purposefully put in place inefficient structures to realize these goals.134
Sometimes it is a good idea to take time, encourage dissent, and take the
long term view.135 This too, can be “efficient” in its own way, because
efficiency is defined relative to the goal we are interested in accomplishing.
The goal in the public sphere is not necessarily the private sector analog of
production or profit maximization, but rather public welfare, justice, and
fairness.136 If economic models of behavior determine the scope of First
Amendment protection, then it is not surprising that distinctions such as
private employment and public employment come to be viewed as
anachronistic or artificial.
Finally, the Court may be conceding too much to efficiency
132
This buttresses Professor Kozel’s argument that the disruption prong constitutionalizes a
“heckler’s veto.” See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
133
For example, it may be economically “efficient” to decide on a zoning ordinance based on the
opinion of experts, but public meetings and other deliberative and transparency-related processes that
may be less “efficient” can be more legitimate.
134
The classic reference is Federalist 51 in which James Madison argued that “[a]mbition must be
made to counteract ambition.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Ian Shapiro ed.,
2009); see also Elena Kagan, supra note 17, at 2342 (discussing Federalist 51). As Gary Wills notes,
some argue that inefficiency is a safeguard against despotism. GARY WILLS, A NECESSARY EVIL: A
HISTORY OF AMERICAN DISTRUST OF GOVERNMENT 318–19 (1999).
135
See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2344–45 (2006) (noting that efficiency is not the equivalent
of wisdom, which requires “tradition-bound professionalism and the realization that future generations
will feel the effects of earlier politicians’ decisions”).
136
See Exec. Order No. 13,563, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215–16 (2011) (stating that cost and benefits are
only one principle of regulation); JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT 317–18 (1989) (arguing that government efficiency needs to be tailored to
the goal we are interested in meeting, such as accountability and fairness); cf. William E. Scheuerman,
Democratic Experimentalism or Capitalist Synchronization? Critical Reflections on DirectlyDeliberative Polyarchy, 17 CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 101, 126–27 (2004) (arguing that efficiency is
primarily a demand imposed by markets, not democratic theory).
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concerns.
While efficiency is important, it is hardly the only value that
guides government. If efficiency was the paramount concern for
government, we might dispense with warrants, transparency requirements,
due process safeguards, affirmative action programs, and other constraints
on government action that may impose inflated costs but enhance fairness,
representation, and social welfare.
B. The Double Privatization of Public Service
The leveling down of speech protections for public employees stems
from an ideology where public employment is not very different from
private sector employment.138 Yet the speech cases are part of an even
larger trend that views public service itself as something that can be
privatized. This section highlights the ways in which this trend matches
the ideology underlying the public employee speech cases.
The
privatization of public service operates in two directions. First, many
activities that were once performed by the government are now outsourced
to the private sphere. This is a move from government outwards. Second,
civil service reforms increasingly incorporate private sector models of
management, especially employment at will. This is a move from the
market into government, resulting in the marketization of the bureaucracy.
Both these trends, I claim, permeate all levels of government, buttress the
Court’s public employee speech doctrine, and contribute to a loss of
valuable speech.
1. Privatization139
Federal and state governments have increasingly privatized a
significant portion of their work, ranging from the use of contractors for
the war efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan and the development of weapons
and technology, to disaster relief, education, the provision of welfare
services, the management of prisons and border control, and the delivery of
countless other services and key aspects of regulation and policymaking.140
Although estimates are controversial, some estimate the number of private
137
This too may stem from the penetration of private sphere logic into the public sphere. See
JANICE GROSS STEIN, THE CULT OF EFFICIENCY 24–27 (2001) (examining the “marketization of our
language in public life”).
138
Paul Secunda argues that the convergence tendencies extend to the Fourth Amendment context
as well. Paul M. Secunda, Privatizing Workplace Privacy, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 277, 278–80
(2012).
139
I use the words privatization, outsourcing, and contracting interchangeably to describe the
tendency of policymakers to rely on the private sector to perform tasks that were previously thought to
be distinctly public. See Jody Freeman & Martha Minow, Introduction: Reframing the Outsourcing
Debates, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 1 (Jody
Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009) (using these terms in the same manner).
140
Id. at 1–2, 13.
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contractors at the federal level to be twelve times the number of
government employees.141 The reasons for privatization are manifold, but
can be broadly attributed to two factors. The first is a culture of mistrust
that is suspicious of any concentration of power for fear of abuse and
corruption. On this view, it is not public power that is troubling, but its
centralization and aggrandizement, making popular control difficult.
Privatization relieves some of these pressures by diffusing power to
multiple actors, with the concomitant effect of government as a monitor of
power rather than its locus.142 The second factor is couched in economic
concerns that view privatization and deregulation as an engine of private
sector innovation and improved performance, as well as a way to overcome
bureaucratic ossification.143 From this perspective the decision whether to
privatize turns on which sector does the job more efficiently rather than
whether the function should be performed, in principle, by the state. The
focus on efficiency becomes a focus on cost minimization, while more
idealistic notions of public service or non-instrumentalist constraints are
jettisoned or deemphasized.144
Encompassing vast areas of our life, privatization often masks the
political choices it entails and the legal outcomes it generates. Private
employees doing governmental work are now directly responsible to their
employers, and not to the people or the public interest.145 Correlatively,
when government steps out of the picture it becomes less familiar with the
situation on the ground. When crucial elements of public policy are shared
by non-governmental actors, each actor adds its own world of political
economy that may produce programs that differ significantly from those
that would result from direct government implementation.146 Finally, by
removing state action and having the service performed by a private entity,
its actions are largely immune from judicial review and public law norms
such as Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, due process
safeguards, open meeting laws, enforcement proceedings, and notice and
141
Paul R. Verkuil, Outsourcing and the Duty to Govern, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT:
OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 139, at 310, 311.
142
William J. Novak, Public-Private Governance: A Historical Introduction, in GOVERNMENT BY
CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, supra note 139, at 23, 32–33.
143
Sharon Dolovich has named this “comparative efficiency.” Sharon Dolovich, How
Privatization Thinks, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY,
supra note 139, at 128, 128 [hereinafter Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks]; Sharon Dolovich, State
Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437, 441 (2005).
144
Thus, privatization recasts the public/private distinction as a difference between organizational
forms. See Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks, supra note 143, at 145.
145
See generally Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts
Challenges Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005) (describing
how privatizing military activities can lead to a lack of transparency, accountability, and oversight).
146
Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction, in
THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
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comment procedures.
Even the decision to privatize is sometimes only
known to public officials, preventing public participation.148 The decision
to privatize public service is thus not only a political decision portrayed as
an efficiency-based apolitical choice, but one that has legal implications for
the purpose of accountability and oversight.149
Privatization reflects and shapes the way we conceive of government,
public employees, and public service. Under privatization, the public
sector is viewed primarily as a site of exchange where citizens seek to
maximize the return on their investments; the logic of privatization is that it
makes no difference who provides the service because government is
already viewed as an agent of service rather than a site of deliberation,
participation, and public regarding activity.150 True, the governmental
decision-making process can be deliberative and participatory even if the
execution of the decision is done by a private party. Similarly, a private
contractor may be required to act in a public-regarding manner. Yet, one
consequence of increased privatization is the transfer of discretion and
policy-making power to the private sector, the blurring of the
policymaking/implementation spheres, and the concomitant decline in the
ability for effective monitoring.151
Like the public employee speech cases, the economic logic of
privatization has come to be reflected in constitutional law, with the state
action doctrine being the paradigmatic example. Initially, the Court was
receptive to the application of constitutional law to private actors. In

147
See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 734–35, 745 (2010)
(describing how private workarounds allow the executive to exercise greater discretion that is more
difficult for legislatures or courts to review); see also David H. Rosenbloom & Suzanne J. Piotrowski,
Outsourcing the Constitution and Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 103, 104–05
(2005) (describing how constitutional and administrative law restraints on government agencies are not
applicable to private entities performing public work). See generally Adam Shinar, Dissenting from
Within: Why and How Public Officials Resist the Law, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 601, 640 (2013)
(describing how outsourcing governmental activities allows public officials to evade judicial scrutiny).
Although private actors are occasionally treated as state actors, the Court has embraced a narrow view
of when a private act constitutes state action. See Daphne Barak-Erez, A State Action Doctrine for an
Age of Privatization, 45 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1169, 1172 (1995) (stating the Supreme Court will treat
private actions as state actions only in special circumstances).
148
See Ellen Dannin, Red Tape or Accountability: Privatization, Public-ization and Public
Values, 15 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 136 (2005) (noting that the contracting and bidding
process is usually kept secret).
149
For attempts to apply administrative law norms to private actors engaged in the delivery of
public services, see, e.g., Kimberly N. Brown, Government by Contract and the Structural
Constitution, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 491, 529–34 (2011); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public
Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 574–92 (2000).
150
Dolovich, How Privatization Thinks, supra note 143, at 143–45.
151
See, e.g., Ellen Dannin, To Market, to Market: Legislating on Privatization and
Subcontracting, 60 MD. L. REV. 249, 254 (2001) (arguing that most states lack regularized oversight of
contracting).
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Marsh v. Alabama, the Court created the “public function” doctrine,
reversing a trespass conviction of a woman who distributed religious
leaflets in a “company town,” thus rendering actions by a privately owned
town as state action.153 The same year that Pickering was decided, Marsh
was expanded in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc.154 to cover picketing in privately held shopping
centers.155 But similar to Pickering’s legacy, the Court soon narrowed the
scope of the public function doctrine.156 Indeed, its curtailment happened
around the same time that public employees began to see their speech
rights dwindle. Beginning in the 1970s, the Court first overruled Logan
Valley Plaza by denying First Amendment application to shopping
centers.157 It then held that the public function doctrine was limited to
activities “traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state” or
“traditionally associated with sovereignty.”158 This formulation served to
remove state action status from, among others, employees who spoke in
government financed schools, nursing homes, prisons, public utility
companies, and government-endowed monopolies.159 Those who were
affected by these decisions were thus unable to assert constitutional claims,
leaving them vulnerable to vagaries of the market160
2. Civil Service Reforms
Although the privatization debate has mostly focused on the functions
transferred to the private sphere, privatization’s effects on public
employees and public service are less explored. As a result of
privatization, the public workforce has become smaller.161 In an attempt to
become more efficient, many public employees have lost civil service
protections; many have been converted to employees at will. Public sector
unions, along with collective bargaining rights, are under attack.162 The
status of public employment itself has, in some cases, been privatized.
152

326 U.S. 501 (1946).
Id. at 507–10.
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391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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Id. at 309.
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Barak-Erez, supra note 147, at 1186.
157
Hudgens v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 424 U.S. 507, 520 (1976).
158
Flagg Bros. Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978); Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S.
345, 353 (1974).
159
See Barak-Erez, supra note 147, at 1177–80, 1185 (discussing cases in these settings where
state action status was rejected).
160
A plausible argument is that given increased privatization, some private sector employees who
work in privatized services should also enjoy First Amendment rights. While I do not develop the
point further, it is consistent with my overarching argument.
161
See Michaels, supra note 147, at 752 (discussing legislative caps restricting the number of
employees government can hire).
162
See Monica Davey & Steven Greenhouse, Big Budget Cuts Add Up to Rage in Wisconsin, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2011, at A1 (describing efforts to decrease union benefits in Wisconsin).
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Below I briefly explore the changing world of public sector employment
and then discuss its implications for public employee speech.
Public sector employment has undergone three major phases. In the
first phase, the executive was in charge of appointing most bureaucrats,
mostly through a system of spoils and political patronage, thus ensuring
responsiveness to and conformity with political pressures. The Pendleton
Act, passed in 1883,163 sought to replace this system, which many viewed
as corrupt,164 with a system based on merit and greater separation between
politics and administration.165 The merit system, however, generated
concerns of administrative inefficiency and ossification.166 Bureaucrats
were seen as detached, resistant to political pressures, and largely
following their own agenda, thus undermining democratic accountability.
The idea that government was the problem, not the solution, marshaled
most notably by President Reagan, impacted the structure of public service
and correlated with the rise of the New Public Management movement,
which advocated the importation of private sector management models into
the public sector.167 This was reflected in the third phase of deregulation,
privatization, and civil service reforms, where we find ourselves today.168
Although the picture at the federal level has remained relatively
constant in the past few decades, there has been greater transformation at
the sub-national level, amounting to nothing short of an attack on civil
service workers.169 Many states have started to experiment with converting
their employees to at-will status, believing that this will guarantee greater
responsiveness to managers—who will have an easier time dismissing
nonperforming employees. The move to an at-will model also affected
163

Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act, ch. 27, 22 Stat. 403 (1883).
Jerry L. Mashaw, Federal Administration and Administrative Law in the Gilded Age, 119
YALE L.J. 1362, 1391 (2010).
165
Id. at 1390–91.
166
For additional sources discussing the proposition of bureaucratic non-responsiveness to
political will, see generally Richard C. Kearney & Chandan Sinha, Professionalism and Bureaucratic
Responsiveness: Conflict or Compatibility?, 48 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 571 (1988); James P. Pfiffner,
Political Appointees and Career Executives: The Democracy-Bureaucracy Nexus in the Third Century,
47 PUB. ADMIN REV. 57 (1987).
167
See Christopher Hood, A Public Management for All Seasons?, 69 PUB. ADMIN. 3, 3–4 (1991)
(discussing “New Public Management,” which includes a reversal of government growth and a shift
towards privatization).
168
See generally Donald E. Klinger, Societal Values and Civil Service Systems in the United
States, in CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN THE STATES: PERSONNEL POLICY AND POLITICS AT THE
SUBNATIONAL LEVEL 11 (J. Edward Kellough & Lloyd G. Nigro eds., 2006) (describing the changes in
the civil service system in the past quarter century).
169
See, e.g., James S. Bowman & Jonathan P. West, Removing Employee Protections: A ‘See No
Evil’ Approach to Civil Service Reform, in ETHICS AND INTEGRITY OF GOVERNANCE: PERSPECTIVES
ACROSS FRONTIERS 181, 184 (Leo W.J.C. Huberts et al. eds., 2008) (discussing civil service reform at
the federal level); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1042–50 (discussing
the marketization of bureaucracy).
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other due process rights, grievance procedures, disciplinary appeals, and
termination notices, some of which were scrapped.
For example, the Texas civil service has been completely
declassified.170 All public sector employees are now employees at will
who have been stripped of due process protections and job security.
Similar efforts are underway in about twenty-eight states that have
experimented with at-will employment for some of its public sector
employees.171 In Kansas, every top level job that becomes vacant is
automatically converted to an at-will position.172 In South Carolina, the
state personnel system was decentralized and eliminated career protections
from hundreds of high-level employees, before abolishing its merit system
altogether in favor of employment at will.173 In Arkansas, managers are
given especially wide latitude over employment matters.174 In Alaska,
reclassifying employees as at-will is subject to managerial discretion, even
if union contracts stipulate the opposite.175 In Nebraska and Utah,
“legitimate business needs” are grounds for dismissal.176 In West Virginia,
the burden is on the employee when she grieves about reclassification or
certain other adverse actions, and in Oklahoma, most of the employee
grievance system was dismantled due to the “pressing need for business
development.”177 Although in many states the number of public at-will
employees is still relatively small, the number is quite large in some
states.178
Driving these trends in the public sector is the desire to increase
executive control of bureaucracy, improve productivity and flexibility, and
enhance performance. Yet there is an uncritical acceptance that private
sector arrangements (such as employment at will) will work just as well in
the public sector,179 despite research showing that job security, not
insecurity, is the best predictor of public sector performance because it
strengthens employee commitment to the organization.180 Indeed, as states
170
Steven W. Hays & Jessica E. Sowa, A Broader Look at the “Accountability” Movement: Some
Grim Realities in State Civil Service Systems, 26 REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 102, 108 (2006).
171
Id. at 107–08.
172
Id. at 109.
173
Id.
174
See id. at 111 (noting that Arkansas has given managers “absolute authority over all [human
resource management] issues short of discrimination and retaliation”).
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
See id. at 113 (listing the percentage of at-will public employees as follows: Texas 100%;
Georgia 72%; Idaho 48%; Kansas 40%; Colorado 35%; Oklahoma 33%; West Virginia 30%; and
Illinois, Washington, and Ohio 20%).
179
Jerrell D. Coggburn, At-Will Employment in Government: Insights from the State of Texas, 26
REV. PUB. PERSONNEL ADMIN. 158, 159 (2006).
180
Id. at 167–68. Similarly, employees tend to value organizations that have due process
protections. See, e.g., Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional
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gain more experience operating under at-will arrangements, they become
either less enthusiastic or more realistic about its promise of greater
efficiency.181
State civil service reform efforts are couched in a language of
efficiency and strengthening managerial authority, the same terms used by
the Court in Waters, Connick, and Garcetti to scale back speech
protections.182 Indeed, the emphasis on managerial prerogative in the free
speech cases runs parallel to the same impulse when reforming civil
service systems: a preference for private sector models of productivity and
management. In the civil service context, this move is illustrated by the
drive to privatization and outsourcing, accompanied by the erosion of
traditional civil service protections.183 In the speech context, we see the
move in references to management prerogatives, non-disruption, and client
service. Yet, it is the same line of thought producing and informing these
outcomes.
C. Connecting the Dots: The Triple Loss of Public Employee Speech
Privatization and civil service reforms are viewed either through the
lens of diminished accountability and oversight or through a
labor/employment law focus on the erosion of civil service protections.
How these structural changes affect the exercise of public employee speech
is often overlooked. First, privatization and outsourcing mean that there
are fewer public employees.184 Thus there is simply less (quantitatively)
speech available since potential speech goes “private” where it is
controlled by the employer. Second, privatization means severing the link
between the state and the employee. Private employees do what used to be
government work, but unlike public employees, they will rarely possess
Approaches, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 580 (1995) (defining procedural legitimacy for an
organization, and noting that organizations garner moral acceptance by employing socially accepted
procedural safeguards); Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and Legitimation, 57
ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 380, 383 (2006) (noting that employees’ views of the legitimacy of
organizational rules affects their decisions to follow those rules).
181
See Jerrell D. Coggburn et al., State Government Human Resource Professionals’ Commitment
to Employment At Will, 40 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 189, 201–02 (2010) (describing a study wherein
human resource professionals who worked in the private sector tended to have less strong feelings
about producing desirable results for the government); Stephen E. Condrey & R. Paul Battaglio, Jr., A
Return to Spoils? Revisiting Radical Civil Service Reform in the United States, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV.
425, 427 (2007) (finding that there is no good evidence suggesting that civil service reforms improved
service delivery).
182
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425–26 (2006); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 674–75
(1994); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 156–57 (1983).
183
Condrey & Battaglio, supra note 181, at 425.
184
This joins the current political antipathy toward public sector employees. See Stephen F.
Befort, Public-Sector Employment Under Siege, 87 IND. L.J. 231, 232 (2012) (recognizing that public
employers have resorted to “layoffs, hiring freezes, wage freezes, and employee furloughs”).
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constitutional speech rights. Those rights, even though they have been
restricted over the years, could have provided at least some (though
minimal) protection had the services remained within the public sector.185
Expanding the state action doctrine could have served a useful corrective,
but the Court rejected that path. Third, civil service reforms, the
conversion to at-will status, and the erosion of traditional due process
protections are in themselves a type of chilling effect. By changing the
employment paradigm, the remaining public employees are less free to
speak about their agencies and are more likely to silence themselves on the
fear that they will lose their job. Thus, there is less protection for the
speech that does remain “public.” The effects of privatization and civil
service reforms join the declining protection of public employee speech
that was detailed in Part II, thus making for a triple loss of speech.
By changing the workplace governance structure and relying on firms
to deliver government services, the government has become dependent on
the services of particular providers while encountering substantial
difficulties in monitoring the various activities it outsources.186 Similarly,
the public’s monitoring capacity also declines when its relationship to the
public good becomes triangular instead of bilateral. This should increase
the value of public employee speech, for public employees sit at the
triangular intersection as monitors of public markets and can thus mitigate
the concomitant loss in monitoring ability. But rather than counter the
state’s privatizing tendencies, public employee speech doctrine reflects
them.
On its own, each trend—the de facto convergence of public and private
employee speech, privatization, and state civil service reforms—raises
challenges for governance and accountability. Examined together, they
interact to form a significant but overlooked transformation in the speech
rights of public employees. When government is run like a business, either
by exporting services and functions to the private sector, or by importing
private sector management models, it is not surprising that these logics
permeate all levels of government, including the Supreme Court.
Evidence of this can be found in a case where the Court addressed the
relationship between government outsourcing and speech. In Board of
County Commissioners v. Umbehr,187 a waste removal contractor had his
contract terminated after criticizing county officials.188 The Court held that
185
In research that focused on civil service reforms in Texas, twenty percent of personnel
managers believe that at-will employment discourages employees from freely voicing objections to
management directives and from blowing the whistle on illegal activities. Coggburn, supra note 179,
at 171.
186
See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1369
(2003) (bemoaning the inadequacy of the state action doctrine as a tool to constrain privatization).
187
518 U.S. 668 (1996).
188
Id. at 671.
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the First Amendment may protect speech made by independent contractors,
and that the Pickering test, adjusted to weigh the government’s interests as
contractor rather than as employer, determines the extent of that
protection.189
While the decision may seem to be pro-speech since it expands the
circle of who counts as a government employee for the purpose of the First
Amendment, it ignores the reality of the workplace. True, contractors now
enjoy some speech rights when performing government contracts, but those
rights do not extend to the contractors’ employees.190 Umbehr actually
supports a restrictive view of the First Amendment. In Umbehr it was the
contractor himself who spoke.191 A private employee, working for a
contractor who performs an outsourced job, is not likely to speak because
(a) she wants to keep her job, and (b) her employer would like to retain the
government contract. Thus, the outsourcing adds another layer between
the employee and the government. If the Court wanted to equalize the
rights of public employees and those performing government contracts, the
correct reference point would have been individual employees and not the
employer (contractor). This is so because the idea (and value) of public
employee speech is that it is the employee who will often be in the best
position to detect and inform others of wrongdoing, illegality, waste, fraud,
abuse, and other problems that the public or the employers need to know
about. Extending speech protections only to the contractor is tantamount to
giving speech rights only to government agency heads who are often not
interested in exposing intra-organizational problems. Umbehr is therefore
a further entrenchment of the managerial rights prerogative that is
prevalent in the private sector.
***
The public/private convergence in public employee speech has
occurred in three sites:
(1) The de facto equalization of public and private
employees speech, placing both on relatively equal
footing. This convergence stems from a more general
free market orientation that, in its extreme, does not
distinguish the two types of employees.
(2) Increased privatization, outsourcing, and government
contracting.
These moves delegate important
government functions to private actors who, for the
189

Id. at 678–79.
That relationship is still governed by the rules of employment at will that present few obstacles
to dismissal.
191
Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 671.
190
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most part, do not enjoy constitutional free speech
protections.
(3) State civil service reforms that import market models of
personnel administration, most prominently at-will
employment, and eliminate or erode traditional civil
service protections, which make dissenting speech less
likely.
Examined together, these sites combine to produce a significant and
overlooked loss in public employee speech.
IV. AGAINST CONVERGENCE: AN ARGUMENT FOR INTERNAL CHECKS
Identifying a convergence between the public and private sectors is not
tantamount to its normative rejection. Maybe government should be run
like a business.192 Maybe public and private employees should enjoy a
similar set of speech rights. In this Part, I argue that the move toward
public/private convergence should be reconsidered. My argument unfolds
in three moves. First, taking private employment as a given baseline,193 I
argue that public employment should not be similarly treated. Second, I
focus on public employee speech and elaborate on its unique contribution
to democratic ends. Third, I address possible objections to granting
constitutional protection to public employee speech.
A. The Public Sector Is Not the Private Sector
The easiest answer to why public employment is not like private
employment is that the Constitution distinguishes these two spheres and
imposes more obligations on government. The Constitution generally
applies to state action, not private action. While this distinction may be
conceptually incoherent, normatively undesirable, or difficult to apply with
principle,194 it is nevertheless the one that is in place, and it rides on the
intuition that there is something special about government.
The
192
See, e.g., Julia Beckett, The “Government Should Run like a Business” Mantra, 30 AM. REV.
PUB. ADMIN. 185, 186 (2000) (describing the meaning of the mantra, “government should be run like a
business”); Richard C. Box, Running Government Like a Business: Implications for Public
Administration Theory and Practice, 29 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 19, 20 (1999) (warning against viewing
the government like a business); Robert B. Denhardt & Janet Vinzant Denhardt, The New Public
Service: Serving Rather than Steering, 60 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 549, 550 (2000) (discussing the calls for a
market conception of government).
193
To be sure, current protections for private employee speech are suboptimal. My objective is to
prevent the slide that seeks to equalize the rights of public employees with those of private employees.
194
See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Rethinking State Action, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 503, 503–04 (1985)
(“There still are no clear principles for determining whether state action exists.”); Jody Freeman, The
Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 176–89 (2000) (discussing the difficulty of applying this
doctrine).
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Constitution is concerned with the abuse of public power and its
interference with individual action.195 The rule of law is concerned with
constraining government action; the government is the organ that must
justify its decisions to the citizenry.
The textual explanation, however, although anchored in the
Constitution and thus inescapable, possesses limited normative force.
There are at least four additional substantive reasons for treating the public
sector differently than the private sector. Such reasons are found both in
the special power that government exerts and its unique location vis-à-vis
the market.
First, private firms operate in a competitive environment geared toward
profit.196 From the consumerist perspective, people believe they are getting
the best deal possible because a truly competitive environment will
maximize efficiencies that will reduce costs, thus giving the consumer a
cheaper and better product. Presumably, private firms can provide a better
product because competition forces them to deploy a host of devices that
mitigate agency costs and discipline managers.197 Consider, for example,
that publicly held corporations face mandatory disclosure requirements,
companies can be taken over, shareholders have exit rights, and consumers
can switch products.198
Government, however, does not operate in a similar profit-driven
competitive environment. The devices which mitigate agency costs in the
private sector are largely absent from the public sector,199 making the
importance of public employee speech greater. In the public sector citizens
will often face problems acquiring information;200 compensation is not
linked to performance, which is difficult to measure.201 Moreover, there
are no similar exit rights and no direct control over the vast majority of

195
See Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 588 (2000)
(arguing that “[e]ven in an era marked by the rise of multinational corporations . . . the claim that public
power is more menacing than private power remains unmovable as a pivot point in American public
law”).
196
Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32, 32.
197
Roosevelt, supra note 53, at 1245; Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci,
Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1425 (2003).
198
Roosevelt, supra note 53, at 1246–47.
199
See Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 197, at 1439 (arguing that “agency costs often afflict
governments more severely than private enterprise”).
200
Jennifer Shkabatur, Transparency With(out) Accountability: Open Government in the United
States, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 79, 88 (2012).
201
For criticism of pay-for-performance measures in the public sector, see generally Patricia W.
Ingraham, Of Pigs in Pokes and Policy Diffusion: Another Look at Pay-for-Performance, 53 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 348 (1993). See also James R. Thompson, The Federal Civil Service: The Demise of an
Institution, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 496, 498 (2006).
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public officials.
Second, the government is often the sole source of a particular service.
Even when it competes with the private sector, different norms apply to its
actions.203 Most of the government’s “products,” such as a criminal and
civil justice system, national defense, environmental protection, police, and
welfare services, are public goods that are not widely available on the
market, if at all. When they are available, we become wary of nongovernment provision: certain services or commodities are too important to
be left to the market; market provision creates negative externalities; and
market provision infringes on the core essence of the product, insofar as it
debases it, corrupts it, or perverts its social meaning, or because
government provision creates collective solidarity and stakeholders in ways
that private provision seldom can.204 While efficiency is undoubtedly a
factor in government provision, it is rarely the government’s exclusive
objective.205 We are not usually troubled with private actors and firms
maximizing their profits (to a degree), though we would be skeptical of
public servants being conditioned to think of themselves as self-interested
utility maximizers.206 Even if public officials were interested in the
maximization of their immediate supervisor’s utility, we would still want
them to have potentially diverging public-regarding interests. This
explains why the privatization of certain services is viewed with suspicion:
Giving a job from government to the private sector means transferring a
task from a world where efficiency is a value to be balanced against equity
and fairness to a world where economic efficiency is the predominant and
paramount consideration.
Third, government can use power in a way the private sector cannot. It
is often the only source of legitimate violence,207 and its status as provider
of public goods requires an element of coercion and authority that is not
found in the market. Moreover, government’s actions bind all of us. Its
power over the people under its jurisdiction is ubiquitous and
202
One could argue that elections are a way to exercise exit rights, but this argument fails. See
infra Part IV.C.
203
See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS 146 (1977) (noting that polyarchy places power into the hands of elected officials who pursue
a kind of public interest while a market system gives power to businessmen who have no such
responsibility).
204
For a recent statement along similar lines, see generally MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY
CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS (2012).
205
See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (rejecting administrative ease and
convenience as sufficiently important reasons to justify gender-based classifications).
206
Donald P. Moynihan, The Normative Model in Decline? Public Service Motivation in the Age
of Governance, in MOTIVATION IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: THE CALL OF PUBLIC SERVICE 247, 252
(James L. Perry & Annie Hondeghem eds., 2008).
207
Max Weber, The Profession and Vocation of Politics, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 309, 310 (Peter
Lassman & Ronald Speirs eds., 1994).
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omnipresent. Crucially, we are the source of that power. Its actions are,
in an important sense, our own, done for and on our behalf. When public
officials exercise power, they exercise power that we have given them.209
Unless we are shareholders in a private firm, we have a weaker claim to
control the behavior of private employers.210 We are thus arguably
complicit in state action, even if in an attenuated way, from which we are
never free. Moving to a different country (or state) is difficult, and will
simply substitute one omnipresent ubiquitous political rule for another. It
is this power that gives rise to unique state obligations such as transparency
and accountability. These obligations apply in the private sector too, but
they are a priori limited because of the prevailing background
understanding that private firms are not like the government and are thus
not subject to similar stringent demands. Moreover, such obligations are
almost always viewed as external constraints on firms, whereas they are
intrinsic to government work. This is why, for example, government
bureaucracies are more “bureaucratic” than their private sector analogues.
We the people insist that they be more constrained, that there be more red
tape.211
Finally, because of their dependence on elected officials for resources
and funding, government institutions, unlike private firms, are more
vulnerable to the risk of being used for improper political purposes.212 This
dependence can include, for example, attempts to restrict speech as a
means of consolidating political power over public institutions, even
without a legitimate governmental objective.213 The unique control that
elected politicians can exercise over governmental institutions (agendas,
budget, and appointments) raises concerns that are less salient in the
private sector.214
The central task of government, then, is to promote “liberty, justice,
fair and equal treatment, and the setting of worthy norms and goals for
208
Paul Secunda argues that public employers also exercise more power over their employees
than private employees, justifying a higher level of privacy protection. Secunda, supra note 138, at
277–78.
209
See Richard Michael Fischl, “Running the Government Like a Business”: Wisconsin and the
Assault on Workplace Democracy, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 39, 64–65 (2011) (“The employer is the
whole people, who speak by means of laws enacted by their representatives in Congress . . . . Upon
employees in the Federal service rests the obligation to serve the whole people, whose interests and
welfare require orderliness and continuity in the conduct of Government activities.” (quoting Letter
from President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Luther C. Steward, President, Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Emps. (Aug.
16, 1937))).
210
Kermit Roosevelt III, Not as Bad as You Think: Why Garcetti v. Ceballos Makes Sense, 14 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 631, 644–45 (2012).
211
WILSON, supra note 136, at 133.
212
Lee, supra note 57, at 1744.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 1744–45.
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social conduct,”
and maintain accountability, transparency, and
fairness—principles that hold less sway in the private context.216
Government has to answer to multiple constituencies, whose interests
overlap and conflict, as part of its role as the guardian of the public interest,
while firms answer to fewer constituencies—shareholders, consumers,
suppliers, boards, regulators, and sometimes employees—albeit in a
focused way.217 The public sector is therefore not just another sector. The
“public” is precisely the locus that democratic societies have devised in
order to facilitate communicative activities.218 Restricting speech in the
public sector is therefore profoundly at odds with a basic understanding of
democracy.
B. Public Employees and Private Employees Are Not Similarly Situated
Even if all the devices to mitigate agency costs were available in the
public sector, there are still good reasons why public employment should
be conceptualized differently than private employment. Turning the public
workplace into a market means losing sight of the importance of public
service and its unique norms and culture. When public workers are
incentivized to operate like market participants, the likelihood that they
will espouse a public service ethic decreases,219 as does the likelihood that
they will exercise speech rights in a way that benefits all of us. This is
partly because the public interest aspect of government work is often
(though not always) not shared by the private sector. Much of private
employment works on an incentive-based pay for performance, which has
the potential to crowd out intrinsic motivations—such as commitment to
public service.220
215
Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 190 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
216
Fairness norms operate in the private context, but the burden on government is still higher and
qualitatively different.
217
John D. Donahue, The Transformation of Government Work: Causes, Consequences, and
Distortions, in GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 139, at 41, 44.
218
For the unique contribution of the public sphere to democracy, see generally JÜRGEN
HABERMAS, THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE PUBLIC SPHERE (Thomas Burger trans., MIT
Press 10th ed. 1999) (1991).
219
See Moynihan, supra note 206, at 255 (noting that public servants that begin to identify as
“market actors” may start to feel that “market control systems allow them less discretion to exercise
moral judgment, and indeed may force them to act in a way they consider to be at odds with public
good”).
220
See id. at 248 (explaining that the “market model” in which “pay and tenure are tied to
measured performance” is damaging to a public service work ethic “through an incentive effect, by
crowding out intrinsic motivations”). On the relationship between crowding out and motivation, see
Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative Effectiveness of Rewards,
Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1151, 1178–79 (2010)
(“[T]he crowding-out literature suggests that when people attribute their behavior to external rewards,
they discount any moral incentives for their behavior, thereby lowering the perceived effect of intrinsic
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There are three reasons why systems that reward self interest crowd out
intrinsic motivations. First, when actors believe their work is valued by
extrinsic rewards they view the “locus of control for their actions as being
external, reducing their sense of self determination and motivation.”221
Second, ethical behavior requires autonomy and discretion. In extrinsic
rewards systems, actors feel they lose discretion, causing them to lose their
ability to consider how their decisions affect the public interest.222 Finally,
actors are more likely to internalize the market model and behave in
desirable ways when financial rewards are present; their behavior itself
becomes a commodity responsive to extrinsic rewards.223 Thus, the risk is
that public service motivation will decrease because of the type of people it
will attract and because the private sector culture will minimize public
interest incentives.
To be sure, the private sector is not monolithic, and workers generally
have a need for autonomy, self-mastery, and purpose. Recognition by
peers, professional prestige, meaningful work, and leadership opportunities
also affect motivation.224 Yet it is the introduction of financial incentives
into public employment in the form of pay-for-performance that risks
crowding out other motivational mechanisms, with the attendant risk of
money’s corrosive influence.225 Moving to a market model in public
employment increases the moral hazard inherent in opportunistic behavior,
which can manifest in goal displacement, neglecting unmeasured aspects of
performance, ignoring due process, emphasizing the bottom line,
marginalizing equity and fairness, and stressing short term gains while
motivation. As applied to the regulatory incentives, crowding-out theory predicts that external
incentives that utilize monetary rewards or punishments may undermine intrinsic motivations.”).
221
Moynihan, supra note 206, at 251.
222
Thompson, supra note 201, at 498 (discussing the “cascading mechanism” of human capital
management within public agencies in which employees feel an ethical responsibility to align their
goals and performance with “the public interest”).
223
See Moynihan, supra note 206, at 225 (discussing identification of public workers as market
actors). See generally Donald P. Moynihan, A Workforce of Cynics?: The Effects of Contemporary
Reforms on Public Service Motivation, 13 INT’L PUB. MGMT. J. 24 (2010) (discussing how the move to
a market model increases the opportunities for moral hazard and the likelihood of crowding out
intrinsic values essential for maintaining the ethos of public service).
224
See DANIEL H. PINK, DRIVE: THE SURPRISING TRUTH ABOUT WHAT MOTIVATES US 80–81
(2009) (noting that behavior that emphasizes the “three nutrients” of autonomy, mastery, and purpose is
“devoted to becoming better and better at something that matters” while “connect[ing] that quest for
excellence to a larger purpose” and has become “critical for professional, personal, and organizational
success of any kind”).
225
See Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects of
Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 632 (1999) (arguing that
financial rewards have a negative effect on intrinsic motivation); see also James B. Rebitzer & Lowell
J. Taylor, Extrinsic Rewards and Intrinsic Motives: Standard and Behavioral Approaches to Agency
and Labor Markets, 77–78 (Inst. Study Labor, IZA Discussion Paper No. 5058, 2010), available at
http://ftp.iza.org/dp5058.pdf (finding that extrinsic rewards have a corrosive effect in public-regarding
organizations).
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focusing on competition—all of which stand in opposition to the professed
goals of public service and public employment.226 Unlike many private
sector jobs (though by no means all), public agencies often have to perform
complex tasks that cannot be adequately measured like those taken on by
market actors. “Many activities are in the public sector precisely because
of measurement problems.”227 The cultivation of a public service ethic,
then, is crucial for the performance of government work, and its emphasis
distinguishes it from private sector employment.
C. Internal Checks, Access to Information, and Public Employee Speech
Public employee speech is an internal check on government power.228
Checks on government are usually conceptualized as external: one branch
checks another, the media and the public check government, and other
actors such as inspectors general check executive performance. Public
employee speech, however, is an internal check because it is done by
employees who are otherwise subordinate to their supervisors.229 In
addition, such speech has a temporal advantage over other conventional
checking mechanisms because it is done in real time. The problem with
public employee speech, however, is that it can also frustrate legitimate
policy implementation and democratic accountability. As Professor
Lawrence Rosenthal has argued, allowing employers to discipline their
employees for speech that is part of their official duty is justified because it
holds officials accountable for the conduct of their offices.230 If managers
cannot discipline and remove officials who are unwilling or unable to
execute their duties as those policymakers wish, then they “cannot be fairly
held politically accountable for the performance of their offices, and they
cannot obtain full and effective control over the performance of public
226

See Moynihan, supra note 206, at 257 (noting that within the market model, and specifically
with regard to “incomplete contracts,” public servants are permitted to “engage in opportunistic
behavior at the expense of the principal’s goals”); see also Dannin, supra note 148, at 127–28 (noting
that the incentive within private-sector employment to behave opportunistically and “cut[] corners”
when dealing with government employers is in fact one reason why public-sector employment must not
move toward a market model).
227
Henry Mintzberg, Managing Government, Governing Management, HARV. BUS. REV., May
1996, at 75, 79.
228
A different justification focuses on the employee’s liberty interests and the republican value of
cultivating a civic-minded community. Stanley Ingber, Rediscovering the Communal Worth of
Individual Rights: The First Amendment in Institutional Contexts, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1, 29 (1990). I,
however, focus on listener-based arguments.
229
For a discussion on the checking function of bureaucracy, see Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H.
Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2311, 2376 (2006).
230
See Lawrence Rosenthal, The Emerging First Amendment Law of Managerial Prerogative, 77
FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 46 (2008) (“[I]f the elected officeholder is to be politically accountable for the
manner in which the office discharges its duties, the officeholder must have the prerogative to control
the manner in which those duties are discharged, including speech-related duties.”).
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offices even after enjoying electoral success.”
This line of argument suffers from two problems. First, Rosenthal has
in mind a vision of an executive office where control is exercised by the
office’s head. Government institutions do not operate in such a way.
Inside government there are multiple veto points in the form of inspectors
general and legal counsel, and outside government there are media outlets,
NGOs, and other institutions that shape governmental policy by bringing
their pressure to bear. This organizational flattening makes identifying the
locus of accountability difficult when things go wrong, irrespective of
public employee speech.232
Second, for government to be legitimate it has to pursue the goals that
people want. Yet there is little reason to assume that the people are good at
monitoring government, that they know what they’re getting, or that the
current level of oversight is optimal. Rosenthal assumes that elections take
care of that problem, since people will vote unresponsive officials out of
office.233 But given how elections are run and the level of voter
information, this argument is dubious. Indeed, one could argue that public
employee speech is desirable precisely because it complements the
democratic process. Whereas Rosenthal extols democratic accountability
through elections, the problems with elections are that they often do not
translate voter preferences into public policy.
Voter ignorance,
information asymmetries, and agency problems between politicians and
voters give rise to numerous problems, so much so that officials can act in
ways that systemically diverge from voter preferences with little or no
sanction.234 As public choice theory demonstrates, there are many reasons
to be suspicious of results generated by the political process, including
231
Id. at 48; see also Cynthia Estlund, Free Speech Rights that Work at Work: From the First
Amendment to Due Process, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1463, 1472 (2007) (“It is all well and good for voters to
elect officials and express policy preferences, but those democratic processes do not amount to much
unless those elected and appointed officials can implement those policies. And most policies can only
be implemented through the words and actions of public employees.”).
232
See JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER
9/11, at 208 (2012) (discussing how recent changes in communication and collaboration technologies
had a “flattening effect” on the executive branch which increased “connections” among actors, both
within and without, and thus resulting in decreased precision as to who in particular should be held
accountable for institutional incompetence or malfeasance).
233
See Rosenthal, supra note 230, at 111 (“The last say on the exercise of managerial prerogative
is had by the voters.”).
234
Christopher R. Berry & Jacob E. Gersen, The Unbundled Executive, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1385,
1391 (2008); see also Edward Rubin, The Myth of Non-Bureaucratic Accountability and the AntiAdministrative Impulse, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGN, DILEMMAS AND EXPERIENCES 52, 70
(Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006) (“Most voters . . . are not perfectly informed about the issues, and the
evidence suggests that they often suffer from apocalyptic levels of ignorance.”); Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 865, 881 (2007) (arguing that elections
will never create “perfect preference alignment” between the President and the public); Matthew C.
Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH. L. REV. 53, 55 (2008) (arguing
that elected officials will almost always deviate from majoritarian preferences).
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elections.
Because elections are rarely about one issue, voters must aggregate
issues and thus cannot do a good job of punishing or rewarding an official
for one thing. This problem is exacerbated because much of government
work is invisible to citizens,236 so even if citizens are useful overseers,
employees still play a unique role. At the same time, monitoring costs are
simply too high for external oversight mechanisms to be completely
effective.237 Congress and courts are increasingly unable to check
executive behavior because they too suffer from information asymmetries,
lack of expertise and political will, and collective action problems.238 Thus
to expect voters and other government institutions to police government
effectively is unrealistic, especially given the increased complexity of the
administrative state. Moreover, elections can only mitigate some agency
costs because often the relational distance between an elected official and a
bureaucrat will be tenuous. Even if elections responded to accountability
concerns, as Rosenthal suggests, they are often unavailing when it comes
to the operation of administrative agencies, especially independent
agencies that are entrusted with a wide range of public responsibilities or
agencies that are largely independent of political controls.239
Another comparison with the private sector is outputs and inputs. The
private sector is controlled by outputs. A firm produces a product that it
needs to sell in order to survive. The market disciplines the firm by
deciding whether it wants the product, i.e., the output, which is reflected in
235
Berry & Gersen, supra note 234, at 1391; see also Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 197, at
1440 (noting that, under a public choice theory framework, policy makers are less concerned with
“some universally recognized set of public interest goals,” and more concerned with advancing their
self-interests).
236
See SISSELA BOK, SECRETS: ON THE ETHICS OF CONCEALMENT AND REVELATION 177 (1982)
(“Every government has an interest in concealment . . . . Concealment insulates administrators from
criticism and interference; it allows them to correct mistakes and to reverse direction without costly,
often embarrassing explanations; and it permits them to cut corners with no questions being asked.”);
see also Wendy Wagner et al., Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study of EPA’s Air Toxic
Regulations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 112, 114 (2011) (describing the lack of public oversight in the rule
pre-proposal and post-proposal stages as a result of various interest groups’ opportunities to engage
agency staff “free of . . . transparency requirements” and negotiate in secret). The public either does
not know what the government does, lacks the tools to acquire information because it doesn’t know
what to ask, or is not involved because of high participation costs.
237
See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–166, 176 (1984) (arguing that congressional
oversight is best described not as a centralized policing model, but as a “fire alarm” model that depends
on “alerts” by constituents and groups).
238
Posner & Vermeule, supra note 234, at 885–891; see Katyal, supra note 135, at 2320–21, 2348
(identifying specific obstacles to checking executive power that Congress and the courts may face); see
also Shirin Sinnar, Protecting Rights from Within? Inspectors General and National Security
Oversight, 65 STAN. L. REV. 1027, 1028–29 (2013) (remarking that Congress often lacks the proper
information and incentives to check the executive power on matters of national security).
239
See, e.g., Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 629 (1935) (limiting the President’s
ability to remove quasi-legislative and quasi-adjudicative officials).
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the company’s stock price. In contrast, the public exercises control of
government largely by deciding on the inputs (elections). There is very
little control over outputs, since the products of government are difficult to
quantify and the responsibilities of officials are largely indeterminate.240 A
common argument in democratic theory, popularized by Edmund Burke, is
that officials should not be subservient to the public because “government
and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and . . . what sort of
reason is that . . . where those who form the conclusion are perhaps three
hundred miles distant from those who hear the arguments?”241 Burke was
skeptical of democracy, but he was right to note the problem of limited
public control over officials that results from the relational distance
between voters and politicians.
If officials make decisions that the public and monitoring branches
have limited knowledge of and little control over, public employee speech
is useful insofar as it counteracts the problems inherent in external
oversight of the political and administrative process. The institutional
location of public employees mitigates problems of information
asymmetries and expertise, partially resolving problems with public,
legislative, and judicial monitoring. Relatedly, many of the issues
employees bring up are those that, for various reasons, do not receive voter
attention. Even if government is “transparent,” many of its actions cannot
be made salient without public employee speech. In the private sector,
because money is at stake, there is a natural incentive to find out about
corporations, and there are firms that specialize in acquiring and selling
this data.242 Firms are thus disciplined by the market, whereas public
actors are often not. Put differently, the market for corporate control does
not exist in the public sector.243
Unfortunately, courts are not sensitive to this reality, as there are very
few instances where they would be willing to overrule managerial
discretion. Because the natural inclination of managers is not to be
monitored, and since superiors often overstate the potential for disruption
given the risk to their authority, opting for managerial discretion in public
employee speech results in a conflict of interests. The private sector
remedy is regulation and forced disclosure, but there is no public analogue
because there are few things the government must disclose on its own
240
LINDBLOM, supra note 203, at 146–48. Because of the problem of output quantification, the
public sector emphasizes just procedures.
241
Edmund Burke, Member of Parliament for the City of Bristol, Speech to the Electors of
Bristol: Speech at the Conclusion of the Poll (Nov. 3, 1774), in THE POLITICAL TRACTS AND SPEECHES
OF EDMUND BURKE, ESQ. 345, 353 (W. Whitestone et al. eds., 1777).
242
See Emily Steel, Companies in Scramble for Consumer Data, FIN. TIMES (June 12, 2013),
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f0b6edc0-d342-11e2-b3ff-00144feab7de.html#axzz2d7RGnfW6 (noting the
number of companies now dedicated to amassing and selling corporate and consumer data).
243
Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 197, at 1427.
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initiative.
Giving managers complete discretion regarding which speech
to censor means reducing the oversight that can be performed by public
employees.
Finally, many public employees—though not all—have access to
information that neither the public nor their supervisors possess. Thus,
they are uniquely positioned to know what ails their agency. Because of
the hierarchical structure of public organizations, managers have relatively
little control over workers,245 resulting in frontline employees having
discretion and autonomy.246 For example, individual police officers still
make basic decisions regarding whom to stop without supervision and
welfare workers decide which infractions to report and which to overlook.
Most fundamentally, the limited resources mean that public employees are
the ones who prioritize between citizens and ultimately decide who gets
what.247 Their practices are the policies that are delivered.248
As an illustration of the above argument, consider Houchins v. KQED,
Inc.249 Following a prisoner suicide at a county jail where the conditions
were said to be exceedingly harsh, members of the media wanted to enter
the premises and take pictures.250 Rejecting their requests, the Court held
that “[n]either the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment
mandates a right of access to government information or sources of
information within the government’s control.”251 However, the Court
added that although access to government information is to be determined
by the political process, journalists are able to speak to prison officials.252
Houchins was decided in 1978, when public employees enjoyed more
robust speech rights and when fewer prisons were privatized.253 The
Houchins Court was correct in assuming that reporters could speak to
244
See Shkabatur, supra note 200, at 14 (“[FOIA] is fully ‘requester driven’—agencies are not
obliged to generate information or proactively disseminate it.”); Roosevelt, supra note 53, at 1249
(contrasting the disclosure requirements for corporations from the “great latitude” afforded public
employers).
245
See William H. Simon, Legality, Bureaucracy, and Class in the Welfare System, 92 YALE L.J.
1198, 1226–33 (1983) (describing a variety of problems with a hierarchical “Weberian” model,
including issues of communication and supervision).
246
See, e.g., MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL IN
PUBLIC SERVICES 13 (1980) (noting the significant discretion exercised by street-level bureaucrats);
JEFFREY MANDITCH PROTTAS, PEOPLE-PROCESSING: THE STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRAT IN PUBLIC
SERVICE BUREAUCRACIES 113 (1979) (discussing the value of autonomy and resource preservation).
247
MICHAEL K. BROWN, WORKING THE STREET: POLICE DISCRETION AND THE DILEMMAS OF
REFORM 303 (1981); Steven Maynard-Moody & Shannon Portillo, Street-Level Bureaucracy Theory, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN BUREAUCRACY 252, 258–60 (Robert F. Durant ed., 2010).
248
LIPSKY, supra note 246, at 84.
249
438 U.S. 1 (1978) (plurality opinion).
250
Id. at 3.
251
Id. at 15.
252
Id. at 12, 15.
253
See id. at 3 (noting that the petitioner was a public county jail).
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jailers. Today, however, prison employees who speak about prisoner
abuse, either to their supervisors or the media, risk discipline or
termination. Houchins assumed that journalists could rely on public
employees to expose prison wrongdoing, yet the subsequent curtailment of
public employee speech undermines that assumption, while shedding light
on the critical role this speech could serve. With media out of the prisons
an important element of accountability is lost. With the decline in public
employee speech rights there is one less countervailing lever to check
official discretion from within.
D. Anticipating Objections to Protecting Public Employee Speech
Thus far I advanced a three-stage argument for protecting public
employee speech. Before elaborating upon my normative proposals in Part
V, I anticipate and reply to objections that question the utility of
constitutionally protecting public employee speech.
1. Public Employee Speech Is Not Sufficiently Valuable to Warrant
Constitutional Protection
Public employees have a unique institutional location and therefore
possess information that is unlikely to be available from other sources.
This is doubly important because people increasingly rely on government
for information, which often comes with greater dependence. When
government’s role in people’s lives becomes more central, people are less
inclined to find out additional and contrary perspectives. New research
demonstrates that lack of knowledge about sociopolitical issues does not
motivate an increased search for information. Instead, it leads to
dependence on government, fostering system justification tendencies. This
tendency decreases people’s capacity to monitor their government
effectively. Public employee speech by people who are knowledgeable
about government work can serve as a corrective, even if a minor one, to
government speech.254
Recently, Professor Kermit Roosevelt suggested that the “First
Amendment is not intended to increase government efficiency. It is
intended to facilitate public oversight of government, and that purpose is
not served by intra-governmental speech. The line between talking frankly
to superiors and voicing concerns publicly marks a real distinction from the
First Amendment perspective.”255 In other words, Professor Roosevelt
254
Concerns with the powerful role of government expression are a mainstay of government
speech scholarship. See MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLITICS, LAW, AND
GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA 92–93 (1983) (critiquing governmental “referee[ing]” and
over-participation in communication); Steven Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565,
570–71 (1980) (describing the questions raised in contemplating government-based expression).
255
Roosevelt, supra note 210, at 654.
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argues that public employee speech is not valuable from the perspective of
the First Amendment.
This argument, I think, embodies a crabbed vision of the First
Amendment. There are good doctrinal and normative reasons to reject it.
Doctrinally, the Court has protected public employee speech even when it
was made privately to superiors without any public knowledge. In Givhan
v. Western Line Consolidated School District,256 the Court protected a
teacher whose contract was not renewed after she expressed concerns to
the principal about racially discriminatory policies.257 The Court stated
that “[n]either the [First] Amendment itself nor our decisions indicate that
this freedom is lost to the public employee who arranges to communicate
privately with his employer rather than to spread his views before the
public.”258 Although Givhan is difficult to reconcile with Garcetti, it was
not explicitly overruled.259 Normatively, why should we adopt the position
that oversight of government can only be achieved by the public? The
point of public employee speech is to provide a check on government from
within. Given the invisibility of much governmental work, there is a broad
public interest in having public employees voice workplace issues, whether
or not that voice makes its way out, because such speech can foster a more
accountable government.260 And that is an end the First Amendment is
designed to advance.
Finally, a possible argument is that public sector unions, not individual
employees, are the best vehicles for raising employee concerns. This is a
weak argument. Only thirty-six percent of the public workforce is
unionized.261 At the very least, there should be speech rights for the
remaining sixty-four percent. More importantly, the argument conflates
union voice with employee voice. Unions have their own interests to
promote. Their speech is valuable, but it should not be assumed that it
subsumes employee speech. At the federal level, for example, union
speech is protected under the Federal Labor Relations Act and covers the
right to “form, join, or assist any labor organization” and the right to
“engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment

256

439 U.S. 410 (1979).
Id. at 415–16.
258
Id.
259
The difficulty stems from the fact that the teacher might have been speaking pursuant to
official duties and was not speaking “as a citizen.” Compare id. (noting that the First Amendment
protects confidential communications), with Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 426 (2005) (holding
the opposite).
260
Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 197, at 1450.
261
Dave Jamieson, Union Membership Rate for U.S. Workers Tumbles to New Low, HUFFINGTON
POST
(Jan.
23,
2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/23/union-membershiprate_n_2535063.html?view=print&comm_ref=false.
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through representatives chosen by employees.”
This includes protection
for speech related to joining or assisting a union.263 The interests protected
are organizational in nature and do not address the matters covered by the
public employee speech cases. Because societal, employee, and union
interests often diverge, we should not assume that union speech subsumes
employee speech.
There are clearly downsides to employee speech. Employees can
magnify little problems, be wrong about the problems they report, and
disrupt the workplace.264 The potential for disruption will be addressed
below. As for the downsides to speech, given that some employee speech
is undoubtedly valuable, the question cannot be whether it should be
protected, but how much should be protected. This will be addressed in
Part V.
2. Public Employee Speech Is Disruptive and Generates Inefficiencies
A central argument against robust protection of employee speech is
that it can cause disruption and inefficiencies, making policy
implementation difficult. This argument is often made in a casual way that
obscures its complexity. There are at least two problems with the
argument: doctrinal and conceptual.
Doctrinally, although the Court insists it is protecting against
disruption, in reality it protects the employer’s predictions of likely
disruption. Curiously in all the public employee speech cases where the
Court upheld the employer’s action, there was no actual disruption.265
Thus, the fear of potential disruption is so great that the Court does not
even wait for it to happen before upholding the disciplining of employees.
So even if anti-disruption is a worthy goal, the Court’s deference to
employers errs by excessively protecting expectations without requiring
any proof of actual disruption.266 Ironically, the Court may be contributing
262
5 U.S.C. § 7102 (2012). State and local employees are governed by labor relations laws that
vary from state to state.
263
See, e.g., Old Dominion Branch No. 496, Nat’l Ass’n Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
283 (1974) (protecting speech that labeled the plaintiffs as “scabs” because they did not join a union).
264
It should be noted that in a survey of federal employees, seventy-four percent explained that
before reporting they wanted to ensure that they had the facts and the evidence to back them up. See
U.S. MERIT SYS. PROT. BD., BLOWING THE WHISTLE: BARRIERS TO FEDERAL EMPLOYEES MAKING
DISCLOSURES 17 fig.3 (2011), available at http://www.mspb.gov/netsearch/viewdocs.aspx?docnumber
=662503&version=664475&application=ACROBAT (suggesting a high level of concern among
whistleblowers that they needed to have enough factual evidence).
265
See Christie S. Totten, Note, Quieting Disruption: The Mistake of Curtailing Public
Employees’ Free Speech Under Garcetti v. Ceballos, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 237–45 (2008)
(discussing a variety of pre-Garcetti cases and noting a repeated lack of disruption found by courts).
266
But see THOMAS I. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 574 (1970) (“There
must be specific proof that the expression has demonstrated incompetence to perform the job, violation
of legitimate orders, or creation of serious organizational disruption.”).
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to workplace disruption. Recall that Garcetti is more protective of
employees when they speak “as citizens,” that is, when they go to the
public with their concerns.267 Going outside and behind supervisors,
however, tends to create more disruption for the organization that now has
to defend its policies publicly.268
When courts protect against disruption they are acting to enforce a
particular view—the employer’s. Yet employers often overestimate the
threat caused by dissenting speech. Employers are concerned with
preserving their authority, making them more likely to view dissenting
speech as undermining that authority, even when the potential for
disruption is low. For example, researchers have found that managers and
superiors are less open to criticism and that an elevated sense of power
decreases their ability to monitor and censor themselves.269 Not only are
supervisors prone to the same types of cognitive biases that make it
difficult for individuals to hear challenges to their opinions, they are more
susceptible to these biases precisely because they are leaders (because of
the position they hold or in virtue of the qualities that made them
leaders).270 Whereas the Court’s deference to the government is justified in
grounds of operational efficiency, it may give rise to personnel decisions
that are rooted in bias.
The conceptual problem goes deeper, for it challenges the position that
disruption is inherently problematic. Disruption may be harmful to the
operation of government, but it can also trigger positive change.
Disrupting a poorly run organization is valuable. Informing superiors
about a harmful policy can improve the organization. Speaking to the
public about mismanagement, waste, or abuse is desirable even if it causes
disruption. Excessively guarding against disruption means promoting
caution, stifling initiative, and risk taking. The disruption rationale should
be thus viewed with skepticism especially when speech is expressed in a
hierarchical setting. Suppressing such speech means that First Amendment
values have little valence in the institutions that matter most: those that
dominate our everyday life. Protecting against disruption, therefore, is too
abstract a goal. On its own it is not sufficient to deny First Amendment
protection.
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Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2005) (emphasis added).
Similarly, external whistleblowing is more likely to suffer retaliation than internal reporting.
Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Whistle-Blowing: Myth and Reality, 22 J. MGMT. 507, 509 (1996).
269
Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & Naomi B. Rothman, Silence and the Dynamics of Power, in
VOICE AND SILENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS 111, 113 (Jerald Greenberg & Marissa S. Edwards eds.,
2009).
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Susan J. Ashford et al., Speaking Up and Speaking Out: The Leadership Dynamics of Voice in
Organizations, in VOICE AND SILENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS supra note 269, at 175, 188.
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3. There Is Enough Information About Government
According to this argument, employee speech overlaps with similar
information that exists or can be obtained through other means.
Notwithstanding that public employees have unique information that is
unlikely to be available from other sources, the argument ignores the
silencing mechanisms that operate in the workplace. The social dynamics
that are prevalent in any organization, especially a hierarchical one, tend to
suppress much employee voice. Sometimes this is the result of explicit
preferences of superiors. More often it is the result of self-imposed
censorship due to the difficulty of expressing opinions in hierarchical
settings. By encouraging public employees to speak out, or at the very
least not penalizing them when they do, we will be taking a step toward
overcoming these tendencies and bringing forward unique information.
The Court rightly conceptualizes the government workplace in
hierarchical terms, but it fails to acknowledge the pathologies these
hierarchies generate. When people interact they have a pervasive desire to
have the good opinions of others. The natural inclination is conformity,
not dissent. As Cass Sunstein notes, this can lead people to fail to disclose
“what they know and believe.”271 If this is true for general society, these
tendencies are stronger in the public workplace where the same people
interact over a long period of time and institutions are less open to
challenges.272 Potential dissenters often have little reason to speak out
because they fear retaliation by their superiors or colleagues, either in the
form of formal sanctions or other social sanctions, such as isolation or
exclusion from important functions.273 Indeed, the “unpleasantness of
standing alone makes the majority opinion more appealing than one’s own
The pressure to conform often leads to anticipatory
beliefs.”274
compliance—employees conform to the behavior that is expected of them
without overt pressures. This may result in excessive concurrence seeking,
one of the hallmarks of groupthink.275 Speaking up is also difficult when
the group has already converged on a position, since it is more likely to
271
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, WHY SOCIETIES NEED DISSENT 9 (2003). For an early example of a study
regarding conformity, see Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A Minority of
One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED 1 (1956).
272
Marcia P. Miceli & Janet P. Near, The Incidence of Wrongdoing, Whistle-Blowing, and
Retaliation: Results of a Naturally Occurring Field Experiment, 2 EMP. RESPS. & RTS. J. 91, 94 (1989).
273
See ELISABETH NOELLE-NEUMANN, THE SPIRAL OF SILENCE: PUBLIC OPINION—OUR SOCIAL
SKIN 203–04 (2d ed. 1993) (recounting experiments that explored human subjects’ responses to threats
of isolation).
274
Gregory S. Berns et al., Neurobiological Correlates of Social Conformity and Independence
During Mental Rotation, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 245, 245 (2005).
275
PAUL ‘T HART, GROUPTHINK IN GOVERNMENT: A STUDY OF SMALL GROUPS AND POLICY
FAILURE 6 (1990). For one of the seminal works regarding groupthink, see generally IRVING L. JANIS,
GROUPTHINK: PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES OF POLICY DECISIONS AND FIASCOES (2d ed. 1982).

2013]

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FREE SPEECH

53

reject deviates. This is known as “uniformity pressures,” where the group
focuses on information all members share and tends to exclude unique
information possessed by some of the members.276 This tendency is
stronger in hierarchical organizations that have a centralized decisionmaking process.277
Of course, not every government organization suffers from these
problems. But the phenomenon of organizational silence exists in most
large organizations. As Professors Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison and Naomi
Rothman found, silence results from power imbalances between managers
and subordinates, who deem voice to be futile or risky.278 Leaders are
consequently deprived of necessary information and organizational
performance can be undermined.279 As Leon Festinger demonstrated,
introducing a hierarchical structure impedes bottom-up communication280
because relationships of power mean an asymmetrical control of resources,
opportunities, and outcomes. Subordinates are dependent upon leaders for
their job, security, and material conditions.281 This produces conflict
avoiding behavior so as not to jeopardize the relationship, resulting in
supervisors not being aware of problems that need addressing.282
Exercising pro-social voice depends on the speaker’s ability to
anticipate the outcome of the speech.283 If employees see that people are
dismissed, relocated, demoted, or harmed as a result of their speech, this
will produce an environment where they are less likely to speak up and
dissent in the future. If voice has high initiation costs, it will be less heard.
Thus the view that there is already a lot of information about the
government is mistaken. It fails to consider the potential speech that is
276
See ARIE W. KRUGLANSKI, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CLOSED MINDEDNESS 117–22 (2004)
(discussing the rejection of opinion deviates and a study group’s focus on shared information).
277
See id. at 124 (“Uniformity may [be] obtain[ed] more readily where one (or only a few)
opinion(s) govern the discussion . . . .”).
278
Morrison & Rothman, supra note 269, at 113.
279
Id.
280
Leon Festinger, Informal Social Communication, 57 PSYCHOL. REV. 271, 280 (1950).
281
James R. Detert & Linda K. Treviño, Speaking Up to Higher-Ups: How Supervisors and SkipLevel Leaders Influence Employee Voice, 21 ORG. SCI. 249, 250 (2010). For an early statement, see
ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE OLIGARCHICAL TENDENCIES
OF MODERN DEMOCRACY 189 (1915).
282
Frances J. Milliken et al., An Exploratory Study of Employee Silence: Issues That Employees
Don’t Communicate Upward and Why, 40 J. MGMT. STUD. 1453, 1454 (2003); see Sidney Rosen &
Abraham Tesser, On Reluctance to Communicate Undesirable Information: The MUM Effect, 33
SOCIOMETRY 253, 261 (1970) (remarking that individuals are less likely to communicate negative
information or information that would have negative consequences for the communicator).
283
Marissa S. Edwards, Neal M. Ashkanasy & John Gardner, Deciding to Speak Up or to Remain
Silent Following Observed Wrongdoing: The Role of Discrete Emotions and Climate of Silence, in
VOICE AND SILENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 269, at 83, 89; see also Brian S. Klaas, Julie B.
Olson-Buchanan & Anna-Katherine Ward, The Determinants of Alternative Forms of Workplace
Voice: An Integrative Perspective, 38 J. MGMT. 314, 319 (2012) (noting that an anticipated positive
outcome for the whistleblower increases likelihood of whistle-blowing).
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suppressed as a result of the workplace environment. Constitutionally
protecting employee speech is a possible way to ameliorate this deficiency
or at the very least protect those who manage to overcome these
psychological tendencies. If employees know they are protected, they will
be more likely to exercise dissenting and critical speech.
4. Whistleblower
Unnecessary

Statutes

Make

Constitutional

Protection

A common refrain is that constitutional protection for public employee
speech is redundant. Since federal and state governments protect
whistleblowers who report on government misconduct, constitutional
protection would replicate extant statutes.284 This argument rests on a
mistaken perception of the protection these statutes afford and
misunderstands the nature of constitutional protection for speech.
Whistleblower statutes, as explained above, are not uniform. Sixteen
states and the District of Columbia do not even grant statutory protection to
public sector whistleblowers.285 Some of the states that grant protection to
state employees deny similar protections to employees of local
governments and other subdivisions.286 Many of the statutes impose
demands that may hinder speech. For example, some statutes require the
employee to warn her superior, whereas others prohibit supervisors from
requiring warning.287 Yet the decision how to speak has little to do with
the value of the speech. Because the decision how to speak is contextual,
statutes that impose only one avenue can create a chilling effect. I develop
this point more fully below.288
At the federal level, experience with the Whistleblower Protection Act
has not been encouraging.289 One reason for this lack of success is a high
burden of proof imposed by the Federal Circuit, the appellate court that
hears federal employee claims,290 and excessive deference to decisions
made by “hearing examiners” employed by the Merit Systems Protection

284

This was the Court’s opinion in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
State Whistleblower Laws, supra note 121.
286
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 440 (Souter, J., dissenting).
287
Id.; see also Ruben J. Garcia, Against Legislation: Garcetti v. Ceballos and the Paradox of
Statutory Protection for Public Employees, 7 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 22, 34 (2008) (noting flaws in
alternative statutes under which the Ceballos case could have been brought).
288
See infra Part V.A.
289
See Sasser, supra note 115, at 790 (noting that only 3 out of a 126 claims raised under the
WPA have been successful). Importantly, national security whistleblowers are excluded from the
coverage of the Act and from the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement. See id. (noting that national
security employees may lose their security clearance as a consequence of speaking out).
290
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 441 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that the availability of
statutory protection depends on the interpretations by federal courts).
285
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Board who do not enjoy judicial independence like Article III judges.
Further, the Federal Circuit has held that statements made in connection
with normal employment duties will not receive protection.292 As Justice
Souter pointed out in his Garcetti dissent, this is exactly the speech that the
Court has excluded from protection on the theory that whistleblower
statutes will provide protection. In a partial response to the Federal Circuit
and Garcetti, Congress enacted the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement
Act of 2012, which protects statements made in the normal course of
duties. The Act, however, covers only federal employees, and excludes
important agencies from its coverage, such as employees in sensitive
agencies including the CIA, FBI, and NSA, to name a few.293 Thus its
scope is quite limited.
The redundancy argument also fails because the First Amendment does
not necessarily overlap with statutory and common law protections.294
Whistleblowing is a particular type of speech reporting on illegality, fraud,
waste, or abuse. Constitutional protection for speech purports to cover a
much larger swath of expressive activity. For example, dissenting and
critical speech like the one made by Bryan Gonzalez would not be covered
by any state or federal statute. The teacher in Givhan who spoke in private
about racial discrimination would not have received statutory protection.295
Right now, only the Constitution can potentially protect such dissenting
291
See Robert J. McCarthy, Blowing in the Wind: Answers for Federal Whistleblowers, 3 WM. &
MARY POL’Y REV. 184, 205–10 (2012) (arguing that the Office of Special Counsel and the Merit
Systems Protection Board have nullified the Whistleblower Protection Act).
292
Huffman v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 263 F.3d 1341, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
293
See McCarthy, supra note 291, at 188 (arguing that a vast majority of whistleblowers have
been “left adrift in the wind”). In four statutes enacted after Garcetti, Congress has protected
whistleblowers who report misconduct related to their job duties and also provided them with enhanced
remedies. Richard Moberly, Sarbanes-Oxley’s Whistleblower Provisions: Ten Years Later, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 1, 15 (2012); see Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126
Stat. 1465 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C. (2012)) (protecting disclosures made
in the normal course of duty, but excluding important agencies from its coverage). The statute states:

If a disclosure is made during the normal course of duties of an employee, the
disclosure shall not be excluded from subsection (b)(8) if any employee who has
authority to take, direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action
with respect to the employee making the disclosure, took, failed to take, or
threatened to take or fail to take a personnel action with respect to that employee in
reprisal for the disclosure.
5 U.S.C. § 2302(f)(2) (2012). The Act’s application remains to be seen. See Moberly, supra, at 52
(describing possible applications of the Act).
294
Even if there is overlap, constitutional rights are an independent source of rights whose
existence and enforcement does not depend on statutes or common law. See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 439
(Souter, J., dissenting) (“[T]he applicability of a provision of the Constitution has never depended on
the vagaries of state or federal law.” (quoting Bd. of Comm’rs, Wabaunsee Cnty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S.
668, 680 (1996) (internal quotation marks omitted))).
295
See State Whistleblower Laws, supra note 121 (detailing state whistleblower statutes and
demonstrating that private discussions are not covered by any of said statutes).
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speech, guaranteeing the rights of all public employees—local, state, and
federal—who are otherwise subject to the contingencies of the political
process.
5.

Regulating Employee Speech Will Result in Excessive Judicial
Interference

A lingering concern expressed by courts is that “[g]overnment offices
could not function if every employment decision became a constitutional
matter.”296 But will this happen? I offer three possible replies.
First, it is a leap to assume that judicial review generates excessive
judicial interference. As suggested above, workplace dynamics indicate
that the number of lawsuits may be suboptimal because of the reluctance to
exercise voice in the workplace. If the mechanisms undergirding employee
silence are psychological, we are unlikely to see a spike in lawsuits.
Instead, protecting public employee speech is likely to help those who
manage to overcome the difficulties associated with speaking up.
Second, the Court has been reviewing employers’ decisions restricting
employees’ First Amendment rights for decades and yet the concern with
flooding expressed in cases like Connick, Waters, and Garcetti has failed
to materialize. The irony of Garcetti is that by curtailing speech
protections, it has invited litigation over what counts as “official duties”
pursuant to which employees are not protected.297 Garcetti’s hope of
ending litigation thus failed on its own terms. Moreover, experience in the
Ninth Circuit suggests that concern about judicial micromanagement is
overstated. Prior to Garcetti, the Ninth Circuit applied its own precedent,
Roth v. Veteran’s Administration.298 Roth extended First Amendment
protections to speech that was part of official job responsibilities299—a
protection the Supreme Court would later deny in Garcetti. Experience
with Roth, decided in 1988, showed that federal courts in the Ninth Circuit
were not deluged with cases.300 The Court’s concern with flooding thus
belies the empirical reality.301
Finally, concerns with excessive intervention conflate the existence of
judicial review with the standard it adopts. For example, courts routinely
review agency action, but for the most part they adopt a deferential
296

Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418–19 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 143 (1983)).
See Totten, supra note 265, at 260 (noting that the Fifth Circuit had to address the question of
“official duties” due to Garcetti not providing a definition).
298
Roth v. Veteran’s Admin., 856 F.2d 1401 (9th Cir. 1988), overruled in part by Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 417.
299
Id. at 1403.
300
This point was raised by Justice Souter in the oral arguments. Transcript of Oral Argument at
5, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006) (No. 04-473), available at
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/04-473.pdf.
301
See Paul M. Secunda, Cultural Cognition at Work, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 107, 135–38 (2010).
297
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standard of review.
Similarly, concerns about judicial intervention
cannot be understood as a plea to eliminate judicial review from the
employee speech context. Instead, attention should be given to the
particular scope of that review. It is this question to which I now turn.
V. TOWARD PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVERGENCE: TWO PROPOSALS
The decline in constitutional protection for public employee speech is
attributable to larger transformations in the public sector that are driven by
a free market ideology, the manifestation of which is that public employees
are no different than private employees. This explains why public and
private employees find themselves on a similar, though not exact, footing
when it comes to free speech; why privatization and outsourcing are
largely viewed as desirable; and why civil service reforms that strip public
employees of traditional protections are on the rise. These trends combine
to generate a loss of public employee speech that has been overlooked by
the scholarly literature.
Proposing particular prescriptions, however, turns out to be more
complicated. The Court did not just “get it wrong.” It turned to this
direction because of its tendency to doctrinally reflect the extant economic
logic. To change course the Court must detach its First Amendment
doctrine from the government’s privatized logic. Put differently, the Court
must counter the privatizing tendencies through its free speech doctrine.
This is more of an attitudinal shift than a doctrinal one.
Whether or not such a shift is likely depends on a variety of factors, the
analysis of which goes beyond the scope of this Article. Below, I confine
myself to two proposals that address the specific problem of public
employee speech. The first seeks to undo the Court’s jurisprudence that
was discussed in Part II. The second focuses on the public workplace and
on the possibility of utilizing internal regulatory mechanisms to protect and
encourage valuable speech. While the first proposal is possible, it is
unlikely to be realized in the near future given the Court’s composition.
The second proposal bypasses this problem by looking at non-judicial
regulation of speech. It thus seeks to avoid costly and often inefficacious
litigation; yet it too comes at a price, namely, the pitfalls of self-regulation
and the lack of potentially meaningful monitoring through judicial review.
A. Judicial Review: Doctrinal Revisions and the Restoration of Pickering
The increasing complexity entailed in determining whether public
employee speech receives constitutional protection is counterproductive,
302
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–44 (1984); see David
Zaring, Reasonable Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 143–44 (2010) (observing that the highly deferential
Chevron standard is the one most frequently applied in judicial review of agency action).
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under-protects valuable speech, and creates a chilling effect for workplace
voice. The solution, I argue, requires a return to the Pickering framework,
taking into account all relevant factors for the speech situation instead of
eliminating some speech as a threshold matter.
Recall the four problems identified above303: First, prima-facie
constitutional protection turns on whether the employee spoke as a
“citizen” or as an “employee.” A person speaks as an “employee” when he
speaks “pursuant to official duties.” Second, much of the Court’s case law
is driven by the internal/external distinction, according to which in order to
qualify as a “citizen” for First Amendment purposes, speech outside the
job is likely to receive more protection, even if it relates to the job. Third,
the Court understands disruption and efficiency in terms that ignore
whether disruption actually occurred and whether efficiency was actually
compromised. Fourth, the Court’s doctrinal uniformity ignores the
institutional diversity of government.
These problems are interrelated. Distinguishing between employee
and citizen is an arbitrary distinction that tries to get at the essence of what
warrants protection. It has turned out to be unhelpful, partly because the
reason public employee speech is deemed valuable is we think employees
have important things to say about the government workplace, and
specifically as it relates to their job—the one area in which their expertise
is the greatest. Unsurprisingly, some of that speech is derived from their
official duties and made in the course of exercising them. By adopting a
formalistic distinction, the Court fails to recognize that employees can act
as citizens when they perform their job duties. Therefore the Court should
not consider speech “pursuant to official duty” as categorically unprotected
speech. Of course, there may be situations where the Court might want to
give less protection to speech that is part of the work product, but this can
be part of the Pickering balance and it leaves the door open, in principle,
for constitutional protection.
Similarly, that speech should receive more protection if it occurs
outside the job is a misconceived attempt to subordinate complex
workplace realities to bright line rules. The Court assumes that when an
employee goes outside the chain of command, there is a higher likelihood
of her speaking “as a citizen.” This assumption contradicts research
demonstrating that the decision how to speak, and not simply whether to
speak, depends on contextual circumstances.304 Sometimes employees
speak to their supervisors or their supervisors’ supervisors; sometimes they
will choose to go beyond the chain of command and speak to the media or
303
See supra Part II.C (presenting four problems raised by the decline in constitutional protection
of speech).
304
For detailed case studies, see ROSEMARY O’LEARY, THE ETHICS OF DISSENT: MANAGING
GUERRILLA GOVERNMENT 26–89 (2006).
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a different government agency. The decision how to speak, however, has
little to do with the value of the speech. For example, employees are likely
to speak inside the job when they believe that there is a good chance that
superiors will take them seriously and work to remedy problems. But
when the superiors themselves are complicit in the wrongdoing or when
they share the views of those the employee speaks against, the employee
may wish to speak outside the job.305
The decision to speak internally or externally is contextual and
depends on the severity of the wrongdoing or disagreement, the fear of
retaliation, the organizational culture, the employee’s status, the
importance of the practice to the organization, and a host of other factors
that do not make their way into the Court’s rigid formula.306
As a result, there are good reasons to reverse the Court’s approach.
Instead of encouraging employees to go outside to receive protection, the
Court should extend protection to internal speech while at the same time
being open to protecting external speech when internal speech is unlikely
to be effective.307 Privileging internal speech, together with protection of
external speech in the appropriate circumstances, means that there is no
good reason to exclude ex ante a particular speech strategy when that
strategy bears little or no relation to the value of the speech and depends on
contextual factors that are not currently embodied in the Court’s doctrinal
tests. Similar to the employee/citizen distinction, considerations of why an
employee chose the forum that she did and why she decided to speak
internally or externally should inform the Pickering balance rather than
preempt it.
Restoring the Pickering balance does not mean that all employee
speech is protected. Pickering still limited employee speech when the
value of the speech was outweighed by the government’s interest in nondisruption and the efficient delivery of public services.308 But, as the
foregoing analysis demonstrated, courts have been overly deferential to
employer perceptions of disruption and efficiency, so much so that courts
regularly uphold adverse employer actions even when no evidence of
disruption and harms to efficiency are offered. In fact, in many of the
305
Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Who Blows the Whistle to the Media,
and Why: Organizational Characteristics of Media Whistleblowers, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 151, 165 (1994).
306
See, e.g., id. (arguing that the decision with whom to speak is derived from situational and
organizational factors); Feldman & Lobel, supra note 86, at 181–82 (concluding that the globality of
illegality within an organization, the emphasis on internal compliance systems, and demographics of
those involved impacts the likelihood of reporting illegal behavior); Feldman & Lobel, supra note 220,
at 1155 (demonstrating that reporting illegalities at the workplace depends on the type of reporting
structure and the underlying violation and other situational factors).
307
For a position favoring “sequencing” (reporting internally and then externally in specific
circumstances), see Orly Lobel, Citizenship, Organizational Citizenship, and the Laws of Overlapping
Obligations, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 433, 462 (2009).
308
Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
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cases referenced throughout this Article, employers often concede that the
plaintiff-employee’s performance is positive.309
What is needed, then, is not an abandonment of the disruption and
efficiency prongs, but a retooling of how those terms are construed.
Specifically, judges should adjust the burden of proof for showing that
disruption has occurred or that efficiency has been compromised, or that
there are strong reasons to believe that such consequences are likely.
Absent such a showing, the justification for adverse employer action is
significantly reduced.310 The evidentiary requirement also goes some way
toward mitigating employer biases resulting from employee speech that is
perceived as challenging the authority of the system. As discussed
above,311 employers often overestimate the threat employee speech poses,
especially when that speech dissents from office policy. Deferring to
employer perceptions buttresses rather than counteracts these biases.
Moreover, it facilitates a conflict of interest whereby those most threatened
by the speech are the ones who decide on its outcomes.
Courts are rightfully worried about overstepping their boundaries and
intervening in areas traditionally left to other institutions, namely the
management of the government workforce. But this does not mean that
courts have no role to play. Judicial intervention is more justified in areas
that are prone to conflicts of interest and biases. Just as courts developed
the “hard look doctrine” to determine whether agencies took a “hard look”
at the underlying questions of fact and policy,312 so too can they adopt this
standard when examining employer actions that limit public employee
speech. Correlatively, employers will be more likely to take public
employee speech seriously if they know their actions will be subjected to
closer judicial scrutiny.313
One main objection to this expanded conception remains. Protecting
public employee speech may harm the government’s ability to convey its
own message or fill positions that require a high level of loyalty. Imagine
309
See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 443 n.15 (2006) (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating
that prior to being denied a promotion, the employee received a “stellar review”); Waters v. Churchill,
511 U.S. 661, 665 (1994) (quoting the employer as stating that, aside from an incident precipitating a
dispute, the employee’s “work was otherwise satisfactory”); Vose v. Kliment, 506 F.3d 565, 566 (7th
Cir. 2007) (noting that the employee had been with the employer for twenty-six years and was in a
supervisory position at the time of incident). This correlates with empirical research showing that those
who speak up tend to be more public regarding their motivations.
310
But it is not eliminated. Other reasons can justify the restriction, such as when dealing with
classified information.
311
See supra text accompanying note 270 (discussing cognitive biases of supervisors).
312
The hard look review originated in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n. v. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
313
See Jim Rossi, Redeeming Judicial Review: The Hard Look Doctrine and Federal Regulatory
Efforts to Restructure the Electric Utility Industry, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 763, 818–26 (arguing that hard
look review encourages democratic deliberation and ensures consideration of competing interests).
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a press secretary who, instead of delivering her supervisor’s’ message, uses
her position to present her own views; a prosecutor who, in closing
arguments, speaks favorably about the defendant’s actions; or a teacher
who is hired to teach evolution and insists on teaching intelligent design.
In these cases and others, if public employees were constitutionally
protected the government would encounter substantial difficulties in doing
its job.
This is a valid objection, but on closer examination it applies only to a
subset of speech and to a subset of public employees. Many public
employees are not hired to deliver the government’s viewpoint, and even
those who are hired for this purpose, do so only part of the time.314
Moreover, most government employees do not staff positions that require
dealing with particularly sensitive information or high levels of loyalty.
This suggests a deeper problem with the Court’s view of public officials.
The doctrinal framework does not distinguish one employee from another
or one government institution from another. A public school teacher, a
scientist working for the EPA, a police officer, and a press secretary are all
treated alike, regardless of their role and institutional affiliation.
This problem is fixable by incorporating two limiting principles. All
public employees should enjoy the First Amendment protections delineated
in Pickering. However, the government should be able to control the
speech of the employees it specifically hires to deliver its viewpoint when
those employees engage in that role. Further, the government should be
able to limit protections for particularly unique positions requiring special
levels of loyalty and trust.315 Thus there is a difference—one the First
Amendment should be sensitive to—between employees who speak about
the government and employees who speak for the government316 as well as
a difference between ordinary workers and those who are placed in
positions requiring significantly higher levels of trust and loyalty.
Government employs many people for different purposes, but only some of
them are hired for these specific purposes. An institutionally-driven
examination of the employee’s role and its relation to the institutional
mission would reveal whether the employee is subverting the message she
was hired to disseminate or creating confusion between her position and
314
See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 437 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“Some public employees are hired to
‘promote a particular policy’ by broadcasting a particular message set by the government, but not
everyone working for the government, after all, is hired to speak from a government manifesto.”).
315
Similarly, the Civil Service Reform Act excludes from coverage any jobs that have
“confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating character.” 5 U.S.C. §
2302(a)(2)(B)(i) (2012).
316
For a similar position, see Helen Norton, Government Workers and Government Speech, 7
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 75, 80–82 (2008), arguing that expressions of the government’s viewpoint must
be clearly identified as such, so that “voters can more accurately assess the message’s credibility and
hold the government accountable for that viewpoint if they so desire.”

62

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1

the government’s. Likewise, it would reveal whether she occupies a
unique position requiring high levels of loyalty, or whether she is speaking
about the government in a way which does not lead others to believe she is
speaking for the government.317
This formulation improves on current doctrine in two ways. First, it
protects a larger universe of speech. Under Garcetti all speech pursuant to
“official duties” is categorically unprotected.318 Indeed, Ceballos was
found to be acting within official duties when contesting the validity of the
search warrant.319 But Ceballos did not speak against the warrant in the
course of prosecuting the case. He spoke about it to his superiors and to
the police.320 True, a prosecutor is hired to deliver the government’s
message when he speaks as the government, but this does not extend to
every facet of his work. By focusing on the employee’s particular function
and role at the time of the speech we not only protect more speech, but we
better protect speech that is at the core of the rationale for protecting public
employee speech—providing an internal check on government conduct.
Second, discarding the ambiguity entailed in the “official duties” test
simplifies the remedial stage. Obtaining damages in § 1983 suits is
difficult because public officials enjoy qualified immunity, the conditions
of which are easy to satisfy.321 Officials are entitled to immunity as long as
the right violated was not “clearly established.”322 Since the “official
duties” test has generated confusion, there will be more instances in which
the speech right was not clearly established. Thus, even if a court
determines that an employee was not speaking pursuant to an official duty,
the government can claim that the employer reasonably believed that the
right in that particular speech situation was not clearly established,
increasing the scope of qualified immunity and making recovery more
difficult.
To sum up, the doctrinal changes recommended here would simplify
317
Although the Court has refused to consider institutional roles as a relevant criterion for First
Amendment protection, a one-size-fits-all First Amendment is unsuitable in a world of institutional
diversity where officials do many different things. See PAUL HORWITZ, FIRST AMENDMENT
INSTITUTIONS 9 (2013) (“[T]he categories with which we carve up the world of the First
Amendment . . . . should be based on the richly complex world of free speech rather than the simplified
legal picture of ‘speaker’ and ‘state.’”); Frederick Schauer, Principles, Institutions, and the First
Amendment, 112 HARV. L. REV. 84, 86 (1998) (“[I]t is increasingly clear that the refusal to draw
doctrinal distinctions among culturally distinct institutions is simply unworkable in the context of the
vast and increasing domain of free speech claims about government land, government funds, and
government employees.”).
318
Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.
319
Id. at 421–22.
320
Id. at 414.
321
See David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court: Judicial
Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 26–27 (1989) (noting that
qualified immunity applies if the official’s conduct was “objectively reasonable”).
322
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
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current analysis by doing four things:
(1)

Abandoning the employee/citizen distinction by
subordinating the “official duties test” to the Pickering
balance;

(2)

Reversing the internal/external distinction, privileging
internal speech while also protecting external speech
when internal speech is unlikely to be effective;

(3)

Engaging in closer judicial scrutiny of employer claims
about efficiency and disruption; and

(4)

Denying constitutional protection to employees who are
hired to deliver a particular government viewpoint when
they speak specifically in that role and limit protection
of employees who, in virtue of their position, have
undertaken significantly higher levels of loyalty.

B. Self-Regulation at the Public Workplace
Revising the doctrinal standards provides additional protection to
public employee speech in the spirit of public/private divergence.
Litigation, however, introduces other problems relating to cost, time, and
additional stress, because litigating parties will often have to continue
working with one another as litigation proceeds.323 Moreover, it creates
uncertainty about how the standards will be applied while hurdles such as
qualified immunity will frequently prevent full remediation.324 Thus,
litigation itself can create a chilling effect by discouraging employees from
speaking.
Against this background, an alternative to judicial review is internal
workplace regulation.325 This can consist in workplace speech policies,
323
See Estlund, supra note 231, at 1475–76 (describing the strains of litigation on the workplace);
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 319, 332–33 (2005) (recognizing that employees are often wary of suing their employers, given
“the cost of litigation and the difficulty of proving the requisite unlawful motive” and the fact that they
will be recast within the business as “victims seeking redress for past wrongs”).
324
See George Rutherglen, Public Employee Speech in Remedial Perspective, 24 J.L. & POL. 129,
142 (2008) (noting the differences with the Pickering balancing test and how an employer can often use
qualified immunity to defeat an employee’s claim that survives the balancing test); Wells, supra note
48, at 959 (describing the remedial process as “obstacle-laden”).
325
For representative overviews of government regulation, see IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE 3 (1992). See also CYNTHIA
ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 82–83
(2010) (“[I]nternal accommodations to the rise of employee rights began as what we might call
‘managing under the shadow of the law,’ but they have evolved toward forms of regulated selfregulation in which the law explicitly encourages and rewards employers’ self-regulatory efforts.”);
Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary
Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342, 344 (2004) (“The new governance model . . . . promises a
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dissent channels, and internal enforcement. Because courts only provide
the constitutional floor, government offices can go beyond current levels of
protection and design arrangements that give employees more coverage
and certainty when they decide whether to speak.326 Because courts are
reluctant to intervene in employment relationships, government institutions
might be better suited to devise more protective speech policies.
Yet if organizations prefer less monitoring, why would they adopt
internal forms of self-regulation when those result in additional
monitoring?327 The answer can be found in both external and internal
factors. Externally, pressure from the public or from other branches, when
the issue is sufficiently salient, may drive organizations to adopt more
expansive speech policies. An example from the private sector can be
found in the enhanced whistleblower protections included in the DoddFrank Act following the 2008 financial crisis.328 Internally, organizations
themselves may have such incentives if they come to believe that speech
protections might avert disaster, or that particular disasters could have been
averted had self-regulation been in place. The promise of decreased
judicial review may also affect organizations’ willingness to adopt more
expansive policies. Finally, increased public service motivation, typically
found in public organizations,329 may also motivate public-regarding
actions such as increased speech protections. These factors create
incentives for a self-regulatory framework that, in exchange for its
adoption, would limit judicial intervention. From the perspective of
employees, the turn to self-regulation might be more promising in light of
the near consensus that private enforcement through litigation often fails to
vindicate common law and statutory employment claims.330 In addition,
renewed dialogue between those who champion centralized top-down regulation and those who
advocate devolution, deregulation, and privatization.”).
326
See Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1250–53 (1978) (arguing that limited judicial competence and
legitimacy does not prevent (and sometimes obligates) other branches to provide more constitutional
protection). Recall also that providing a safe environment for speech encourages pro-social voice. See
supra text accompanying note 283.
327
See Posner & Vermeule, supra note 234, at 898 (criticizing self regulation on the grounds that
an ill motivated executive is unlikely to adopt or respect such reforms).
328
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 922,
124 Stat. 1376, 1841 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-6 (2012)).
329
See infra note 334.
330
On the general failure of private enforcement, see Timothy P. Glynn, Taking Self-Regulation
Seriously: High-Ranking Officer Sanctions for Work-Law Violations, 32 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
279, 289–95 (2012). See also Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs in Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 103–04 (2009)
(showing that the number of employment discrimination suits continued to decline, and arguing that
“results in the federal courts disfavor employment discrimination plaintiffs, who are now forswearing
use of those courts”); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination
Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429 (2004) (noting that
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effective self-regulation will also divert employees from speaking
externally, thus minimizing disruption.331
To be sure, self-regulation is far from perfect.332 In the private sector
employment context its success has been mixed, mostly because employer
noncompliance is often the result of the need to reduce costs to maintain
profit margins. When the ultimate goal is profit maximization, coupled
with minimal legal sanctions and overextended regulatory agencies, selfregulation is unlikely to work and may result in window dressing or
cosmetic compliance.333 But as I argued above, such considerations may
count for less in the public sector where profit considerations should not
claim a central hold on policymaking and where a public service ethos is
more dominant.334 Because the experience with self-regulation in the
employment discrimination plaintiffs go to trial often, win a low percentage of cases, and have a large
percentage of winning cases appealed); Moberly, Unfulfilled Expectations, supra note 113, at 67
(noting the failure of the vast majority of whistleblower retaliation claims filed under Sarbanes-Oxley).
But see Richard Moberly, The Supreme Court’s Antiretaliation Principle, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
375, 376 (2010) (“In each of five recent cases involving statutory-based employee retaliation claims,
the Supreme Court has upheld the employee’s claim and expanded protections against employer
retaliation.”).
331
Elletta Sangrey Callahan & John W. Collins, Employee Attitudes Toward Whistleblowing:
Management and Public Policy Implications, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 939, 946 (1992) (noting that
employees prefer internal disclosure to external disclosure).
This joins empirical findings
demonstrating that employees care about fair processes. Procedural justice itself often bestows
legitimacy, even if the substantive claims are rejected. See Tyler, supra note 180, at 382 (“Recent
research suggests that . . . the willingness of people to defer to the decisions of authorities and to the
rules created by institutions is [determined by] the fairness of the procedures through which institutions
and authorities exercise authority.”).
332
See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, The Wagner Model of Labour Law Is Dead—Long Live Labour
Law!, 38 QUEEN’S L.J. (CAN.) 545, 570 (2013) (arguing that “the power dynamic in the workplace is
suffused with employer control over the employee’s job” making effective self-regulation unlikely). It
is an open question whether those pathologies will be reproduced in the public sector.
333
See, e.g., Glynn, supra note 330, at 305–07 (“[C]laims that . . . forms of self-regulation can fill
regulatory gaps now seem dubious, given the colossal failures of self-governance that contributed to the
financial meltdown of 2008.”); Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of
Negotiated Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 487 (2003) (“[I]nternal compliance structures do not
deter prohibited conduct within firms and may largely serve a window-dressing . . . .”); Kimberly D.
Krawiec, Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 571,
572 (2005) (“[A]n internal compliance-based liability system encourages the implementation of largely
cosmetic internal compliance structures that reduce legal liability without reducing the incidence of
organizational misconduct.”).
334
The higher levels of public service motivation and public regarding ethos in the public sector
have been substantiated in decades of research and demonstrate that public employees are less
susceptible to monetary incentives than private employees. See, e.g., Gene A. Brewer, Building Social
Capital: Civic Attitudes and Behavior of Public Servants, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 5, 20
(2003) (“[P]ublic employees are more civic minded than are other citizens, and they are more likely to
participate in civic affairs.”); Gene A. Brewer & Sally Coleman Selden, Whistle Blowers in the Federal
Civil Service: New Evidence of the Public Service Ethic, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 413, 429
(1998) (finding that public employees are relatively unmotivated by financial rewards, regardless of
whether they are involved in whistleblowing); Moynihan, supra note 206, at 247–48, 263–64 (arguing
that the material rewards that work well in ensuring compliance in private institutions, when applied to
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public employee speech context is limited, what follows is tentative.335
Compared with judicial review, self-regulation has the advantage of
tailoring the level of protection to the particular institutional mission and
the relationship of the employee to that mission. As discussed above, one
deficiency of judicial review is that it treats all public employees alike,
regardless of their role and institutional location.336 While judges may be
reluctant to make such distinctions given their limited knowledge of
particular institutions and their preference for bright-line rules, non-judicial
institutions are not similarly constrained. Public employers and employees
are intimately familiar with the working of their institutions and can thus
make calibrated judgments about the desired level of protection.
Self-regulation also has the potential advantage of being deliberative
and participatory. This can be achieved in two ways. From the employee
side, the public union can represent the employees in negotiations over the
content of such policies. In workplaces that are not unionized, individual
employees, selected by the larger employee body, can participate in such
negotiations. From the public side, the general public and organizations
that are interested in good governance will have the opportunity to provide
input on the precise wording of such arrangements, such as through notice
and comment procedures. Consequently, these policies are likely to be
more speech-protective if they are determined jointly by employees and
employers along with public input. Such a process also enhances
accountability on several levels. The public will be informed about the
management of government as it pertains to speech restrictions, which will
facilitate public criticism and closer scrutiny of government. The
transparency of speech policies is also likely to result in more speechprotective arrangements.337 From the employee side, speech policies will
provide greater specificity, which will presumably place employees on
firmer ground when they decide to speak. On its own, this can have the
salutary effect of facilitating employee voice, since valuable speech is
public and nonprofit institutions, can crowd out participants who are more likely to be motivated by
intrinsic factors, such as public service norms); Hal G. Rainey, Reward Preferences Among Public and
Private Managers: In Search of the Service Ethic, 16 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 288, 297 (1982) (“[T]here
are many public sector employees who do not place overriding value on monetary incentives.”); Esther
E. Solomon, Private and Public Sector Managers: An Empirical Investigation of Job Characteristics
and Organizational Climate, 71 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 247, 253 (1986) (discussing a study showing
financial rewards to be a stronger motivator for private managers than for public managers).
335
The writing on self-regulation, even in the context of employee speech, focuses on the private
sector and its interaction with the regulator (usually as a monitor of self-regulation). See, e.g.,
ESTLUND, supra note 325, at 83–84 (describing how private entities have created internal mechanisms
for handling claims of violations); Orly Lobel, Lawyering Loyalties: Speech Rights and Duties Within
Twenty-First-Century New Governance, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2009) (arguing that internal
reporting encourages an environment of trust and minimizes disruptive speech).
336
See supra Part V.A.
337
For a discussion of the utility of speech policies, see Lee, supra note 57, at 1746–49.
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more likely to happen in a supportive and safe environment.
Courts, on their part, will be more deferential to employer actions.
This is an incentive for both employers and employees who want to avoid
litigation. There will still be judicial review, but it will focus on the
administrative processes leading to the adoption of the policies, such as
making sure that the policy was clear, that it was open for public comment,
and that employees participated in its framing. Courts might be especially
deferential if the policy goes beyond the constitutional floor. In
appropriate cases, courts should also be able to go beyond the inquiry into
process and examine whether, in fact, a good faith effort was made to
address the employee’s concern.
There is nothing radical in such a process. Self-regulation in the
private sector often operates along these lines.338 For example, the United
States Sentencing Commission’s Organizational Sentencing Guidelines
allow for a reduction in criminal sentences where the organization has
engaged in an “effective compliance and ethics program” and “promote[s]
an organizational culture that encourages ethical conduct and a
commitment to compliance with the law.”339 This has led many firms to
enact such programs, to various degrees of effectiveness, and it has been
adopted in other areas, such as environmental law, healthcare law, and
occupational safety and health law.340 A similar pattern exists in the
employment discrimination context. The Ellerth/Faragher defense to
workplace sexual harassment allows employers to avoid vicarious liability
for sexual harassment committed by supervisory employees if the
employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct sexually
harassing behavior and if the employee failed to take advantage of any
preventative or corrective opportunities provided by the employer.341 As
scholars have observed, both employers and employees can invoke the
existence of internal compliance structures as circumstantial evidence for
proving discriminatory intent.342
The experience with such regimes is mixed, for two main reasons.343
Private firms operate in a competitive environment where they naturally
338
See Lobel, supra note 325, at 344–45 (describing the move from command and control to new
governance regimes).
339
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2010).
340
ESTLUND, supra note 325, at 78.
341
E.g., Pa. State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 134 (2004); Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524
U.S. 775, 807 (1998); Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); see also Kolstad v. Am.
Dental Ass’n, 527 U.S. 526, 545–46 (1999) (allowing an affirmative defense to Title VII suits for
punitive damages if the employer promulgated anti-discrimination policies and provided antidiscrimination education).
342
E.g., Glynn, supra note 330, at 311 n.167.
343
See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & David Lazer, Management-Based Regulation: Prescribing
Private Management to Achieve Public Goals, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 691, 724–25 (2003) (concluding
that the empirical record is mixed).
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seek to reduce compliance costs. Self-regulation is often costly, making
these arrangements less robust than they could have been. In addition,
information asymmetries between firms and regulators can lead firms to
adopt internal compliance structures that look good on paper but which fail
to address the underlying wrong.344
While this mixed track record casts some doubt on the likely success of
governmental self-regulation of speech, the differences between the two
sectors also suggest that these problems are less likely to be replicated.
The lack of market competition and the general mindfulness of
constitutional rights in the public workplace, coupled with a deliberative
and participatory framework at the front end, militate in favor of an
assumption, however tentative, that such arrangements may be successful.
In addition to providing certainty over what speech will receive
protection, workplace speech policies can also be designed to encourage
employee voice. One common instrument that has been instituted in both
the public and private sector is internal grievance procedures. These
procedures are sometimes created in order to comply with legal
requirements or to mitigate future liability. Initially these procedures did
not insulate firms from liability, but as their usage increased, courts have
come to be more deferential.345 Indeed, private firms determining what
counts as compliance is one risk with self-regulation,346 as is the risk that
such processes will be co-opted and distorted by interested parties like
lawyers and personnel managers347 or that grievance procedures will be
subsumed under a managerial interests conception that will undermine
individual rights.348
Internal grievance procedures may succeed if they are construed more
broadly as general dissent channels that allow employees to challenge,
344

Kimberly D. Krawiec, The Return of the Rogue, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 127, 146 (2009).
See Lauren B. Edelman et al., The Endogeneity of Legal Regulation: Grievance Procedures as
Rational Myth, 105 AM. J. SOC. 406, 408 (1999) (“[O]rganizational ideologies of rationality induce the
judiciary to incorporate grievance procedures into legal constructions of compliance with EEO law.”).
346
See, e.g., Lauren B. Edelman & Shauhin A. Talesh, To Comply or Not to Comply—That Isn’t
the Question: How Organizations Construct the Meaning of Compliance, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE:
BUSINESS RESPONSES TO REGULATION 103, 105 (Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds.,
2011) (“[N]otions of rational and fair compliance that evolve within organizations and diffuse
throughout organizational fields can easily come to influence . . . the rulings of judges.”); Shauhin A.
Talesh, The Privatization of Public Legal Rights: How Manufacturers Construct the Meaning of
Consumer Law, 43 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 527, 528–29 (2009) (“Private organizations’ expanding role even
includes using internal and alternative dispute resolution structures to adjudicate civil and consumer
rights and remedies created by legislatures.”).
347
See, e.g., Edelman, supra note 105, at 48–49 (“[T]he legal and personnel professions act as
‘filters’: they construct not only the meaning of law but also the magnitude of the threat posed by law
and the litigiousness of the legal environment.”).
348
See Lauren B. Edelman et al., Internal Dispute Resolution: The Transformation of Civil Rights
in the Workplace, 27 L. & SOC’Y REV. 497, 529–30 (1993) (arguing that alternative dispute resolution
methods “may undermine legal rights by changing the way in which disputes are framed”).
345
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criticize, and dissent from official government policy while shielding them
from retaliation. One example is the State Department’s “Dissent
Channel,”349 established in 1971 following the fallout from the Vietnam
War.350 The Dissent Channel allows officials to bring forward dissenting
views to the attention of the Department’s top officials in complete
confidentiality and without any fear of reprisals.351 The value of dissent is
also expressed in the “Dissent Awards” given out by the American Foreign
Service Association to officials who “exhibited extraordinary
accomplishment involving initiative, integrity, intellectual courage and
constructive dissent.”352 The award recognizes members who “challenge
the system from within, to question the status quo and take a stand, no
matter the sensitivity of the issue or the consequences of their actions.”353
Some observers, such as Professor Neal Katyal, extol the virtues of the
Dissent Channel and call for its adoption in other government agencies.
Yet, Katyal overlooks the fact that the Dissent Channel has had little
impact on U.S. foreign policy.354 Not only is it rarely used,355 it is still
resented by superiors who are in a position to block promotions.356 The
Dissent Channel is successful, however, in internalizing dissent and
keeping it in-house. This may be good for State Department management,
which goes on the record as formally encouraging dissent, but it has
transparency costs for the general public, as the channel may result in
dissent remaining inside the State Department bureaucracy and likely
buried without being meaningfully addressed.
Dissent can be valuable because, among other things, it raises the
political costs of taking action.357 The State Department’s Dissent Channel
349
See 2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL § 071 (2011) (“The Dissent Channel was created to allow its
users the opportunity to bring dissenting or alternative views on substantive foreign policy issues . . . to
the attention of the Secretary of State . . . .”); Katyal, supra note 135, at 2328–29 (discussing the
Dissent Channel).
350
Hannah Gurman, The Other Plumbers Unit: The Dissent Channel of the U.S. State
Department, 35 DIP. HIST. 321, 323 (2011).
351
2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL, supra note 349, at §§ 071.1(c), 075.1 (prohibiting any adverse
action stemming from the use of the Dissent Channel). As a result of these provisions, most officials
do not speak anonymously.
352
Dissent Awards, AM. FOREIGN SERV. ASS’N, www.afsa.org/dissent (last visited Sept. 5, 2013).
353
Id.
354
Gurman, supra note 350, at 323.
355
No current figures are available, but this seems to be the consensus. In a 1984 Senate hearing,
it was reported that the channel had been used one hundred and twenty-five times in the past thirteen
years. Robert C. Taylor, Improving Management in the Federal Government: 1984 Senate Hearings,
45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 262, 264 (1985).
356
Michael P. Scharf & Colin T. McLaughlin, On Terrorism and Whistleblowing, 38 CASE W.
RES. J. INT’L L. 567, 570 n.7 (2007). Although the Manual prohibits reprisals, it will usually be
possible to provide “legitimate” reasons for adverse employment decisions. See Gurman, supra note
350, at 331–33 (discussing one instance in which a Dissent Channel message generated attention).
357
Of course, there will be times where we would not want the political costs to be prohibitive.
There are times when quick decisive action is necessary.
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reduces these costs because dissent is protected only if it is internal.
Indeed, the channel was developed at a time when the prevention of leaks
was paramount.358 True, employees can dissent by leaking information to
the press, but leaks have costs. The Obama Administration, for example,
has been particularly aggressive in filing criminal charges against those
who leaked sensitive information.359 Leakers are protected only if their
identity remains secret.
The mere replication of the Dissent Channel in other government
offices, a move that Katyal endorses, is therefore unlikely to make a big
difference. What is needed is a political commitment to dissent and an
ecology that supports employee voice. The cultural commitment may even
be more important than the procedural mechanisms put in place to realize
these values.360 The lessons from the State Department’s Dissent Channel
demonstrate that employee voice is likely to be taken more seriously if
there is a chance the speech will not remain strictly within the department.
Self-regulation, then, should provide some avenues for going outside the
bureaucracy, though not necessarily to the public. For example, in national
security matters, Professor Richard Moberly has suggested protecting
Such procedures would
employee communication to Congress.361
obviously vary depending on the context and the particular institutional
mission, but the point is that the internal/external distinction—the one that
should undergo doctrinal reform—applies to self-regulation as well.
VI. CONCLUSION
Constitutional protection of public employee speech has been declining
for the past forty years, but the reason for this decline has remained
elusive. This Article puts forward a novel explanation that situates public
employee speech in larger transformations in the public sector and
identified what I termed as “public/private convergence.” The main
feature of the convergence thesis is that public officials are increasingly
viewed as private employees. This move has far reaching implications in
358

Gurman, supra note 350, at 328.
See Charlie Savage, Ex-C.I.A. Officer Charged in Information Leak, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24,
2012, at A1 (noting that the number of criminal cases brought against leakers of classified information
under the Obama administration totaled more “than all previous presidents combined”); Glenn
Greenwald, Rules of American Justice: A Tale of Three Cases, SALON (Jan. 24, 2012),
http://www.salon.com/2012/01/24/rules_of_american_justice_a_tale_of_three_cases/singleton/
(mentioning the sixth prosecution of a leaker); Jane Mayer, The Secret Sharer: Is Thomas Drake an
Enemy
of
the
State?,
NEW
YORKER
(May
23,
2011),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/05/23/110523fa_fact_mayer?currentPage=all (discussing
the case against Thomas Drake, a former senior executive at the National Security Agency).
360
Recent literature demonstrates that culture, more than particular policies, influences employees
to speak out. Moberly, supra note 293, at 44 & n.303.
361
Richard Moberly, Whistleblowers and the Obama Presidency: The National Security Dilemma,
16 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 51, 140–41 (2012).
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terms of speech rights that up until now have remained largely unexplored.
The project of convergence results in under-protection of valuable
speech. The path the Court has taken fails to acknowledge the role of
public officials in our constitutional system by eroding the checking
function that is uniquely suited to government employees who are often in
the best position to inform the public and their superiors about government
work. To counteract the public/private convergence, this Article has
advanced a vision of public/private divergence insofar as it pertains to
constitutional speech rights for public sector employees. A democratic
society has an interest in receiving information from its public servants,
and government itself should be open to dissenting views. But dissent
cannot take place in a legal climate that is geared toward suppression and
silencing. Convergence brings us closer to that climate. Divergence, I
have argued, should be the way forward.

